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Abstract
Potential accession of a number of eastern and central European countries into
the European Union (EU) seems destined to lead to further reforms of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The financial costs of absorbing these
countries may be extreme.  This report documents the modeling framework
(European Simulation Model, ESIM) used to analyze the 1992 CAP reform and
discusses possible effects of EU enlargement.
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Background2 and Scope of the Study
Agricultural policies throughout Europe have under-
gone fundamental changes in the 1990’s due to inter-
nal and external pressures.  In the European Union
(EU), internal budget pressures generated by the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) combined with
external pressure imposed by the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
negotiations to force a radical reform of its agricultur-
al policy in 1992.  The Agreement on Agriculture in
the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, signed
in April of 1994, combined with the eventual enlarge-
ment of the EU to include Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC’s), will likely force the EU
to further reform the CAP later in the decade to meet
its GATT commitments in agriculture and stay within
acceptable CAP expenditure limits.       
An even more radical change in agricultural policy
occurred in many CEEC’s when central planning was,
in most cases, replaced by moves of varying degrees
to a more market-driven agricultural economy.
Production and consumption declined dramatically as
subsidies were reduced or eliminated.  To the extent
that production can respond to the new market signals
faster than consumption, the near future holds poten-
tial for surplus production and higher levels of exports
from the CEEC’s.  Such a scenario is even more like-
ly and would occur even sooner if the CEEC’s, in
anticipation of EU membership, adopt CAP policies
and the associated higher guaranteed prices.
Three former members of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), Austria, Finland, and Sweden,
entered the EU-12 on January 1, 1995, making it the
EU-15.  By the year 2000 the present EU-15 could
include 2 more EFTA countries (Norway and
Switzerland) and 4 CEEC’s (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the CEEC-4), becom-
ing the EU-21.  An EU-21 would significantly affect
the world’s agricultural trading system under the pre-
sent CAP.
Budgetary constraints in both the EU and the CEEC’s
probably will be a major obstacle to supporting agri-
cultural policies in the EU for two reasons: compensa-
tion payments the EU agreed to pay farmers for
reducing target prices and struggling fiscal budgets in
the CEEC’s.  These budget constraints are particularly
important in determining when and under what condi-
tions the CEEC’s will be integrated into the EU.    
The new EU member countries (with the exception of
Sweden) supported agriculture even more lavishly
than the EU.  Adoption of the CAP by these countries
initially implied lower producer prices, suggesting
lower production.  Some of the EFTA countries
changed their agricultural policies to adapt to the CAP
in anticipation of EU membership or reformed their
agricultural policies somewhat to adjust to budget
realities.   
These countries’ populations and agricultural sectors
are small compared with the EU, but,  because of their
high per capita income, they will be net contributors
to the EU budget.  Because of relatively low agricul-
tural production levels, the newly integrated EFTA
countries are not likely to negatively affect the CAP,
but they could positively affect the agricultural sectors
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of other EU member states as consumers increase
demand in response to lower EU prices.    
The EU signed association agreements with 10
CEEC’s and discussed future EU membership with
them.  Most of these 10 CEEC’s have either applied
for EU membership or signaled their intention to do
so.  During 1996 and through June 1997, the EU held
intergovernmental conferences to determine the many
institutional and constitutional changes that must be
made to cope with both recent and future enlarge-
ments.  These changes, needed to make an enlarged
EU politically workable, could be decisive for the
implementation of conditions determining the feasibil-
ity of the CEEC’s membership.
This report documents the modeling framework
European Simulation Model (ESIM) used to analyze
the 1992 CAP reform and EU enlargement, as well as
the effects on agricultural production, consumption,
and trade of the major commodities of interest to the
United States in an EU-15 and/or an EU-21 under var-
ious scenarios where countries are integrated into the
CAP during different time periods.  The model also
explicitly measures budget costs and gross farm
income annually by commodity and by country group-
ing.  Results from this modeling exercise framed the
enlargement issues and provided some of the first esti-
mates of the magnitude of budget costs implied by
eastward enlargement of the EU for the EU
Commission (Tangermann and Josling).  
Since the end of the modeling exercise, events in the
grain and beef markets evolved much differently than
was assumed in the scenarios.  Specifically, world
grain prices moved above EU intervention levels, and
revelations of a possible link between bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease) and
a related human brain ailment, Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease, resulted in large declines in beef and veal
consumption in the EU.  The model’s results do not
capture these events, which, if considered as tempo-
rary aberrations rather than as representing persistent
structural changes, do not alter the validity of the
basic thrust of the results.  The ESIM model is policy-
driven and provides information on the effects of
alternative policy scenarios, assuming “normal”
weather and that factors not explicitly modeled main-
tain their longrun equilibrium levels.  The results pre-
sented in this report indicate changes that could occur
under various policy scenarios, assuming that world
prices return to their historical pattern below those
prevailing in the EU.  While the delay in publication
of this monograph makes some of the results in the
early years dated, the conclusions drawn from the
results in later years are quite applicable.
Scenarios
Five principal scenarios represent various EU enlarge-
ment possibilities in the analysis.  The scenarios are
cumulative in the sense that higher numbered scenar-
ios subsume previous scenarios.  The scenarios are as
follows:
Base scenario: CAP reform is imposed on the EU.3
There is no enlargement and other countries
(including the three EFTA countries that are now
EU members) continue past policies.  This scenario
provides the baseline for evaluating the other four
scenarios.  
Scenario 1: Austria, Finland, and Sweden join the EU
in 1995, making an EU-15.
Scenario 2: Norway and Switzerland join the EU-15
in 2000, leading to an EU of 17 countries.  
Scenario 3: The four CEEC’s included in the study,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia, join the EU in 2000 to make a total of 21
countries.
Scenario 4: The CAP is further reformed in the peri-
od between 1995 and 2000 in order to “make
room” for the new members.  
Three additional mini-scenarios (base-A, scenario 3a,
and scenario 4a) were analyzed.  Base-A is the same
as base scenario but with lower yield growth rates in
the EU-12.  Scenario 3a is the same as scenario 3
with the important and feasible exceptions that the
CEEC-4 do not receive compensation payments and
are not required to set aside land.  Scenario 4a is the
same as scenario 4, except that the exogenously
determined growth rate in crop yields (representing
3 CAP reform is not discussed at length because its provisions
are well known.  Briefly, CAP reform included reductions in the
intervention price of grains, and the introduction of set-aside and
compensation payments.Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 3
technological improvements) is reduced relative to the
rate prevailing under the other scenarios.  This sce-
nario is predicated on the assumption that lower prices
will lead to lower research and development expendi-
tures, hence reducing improvements in yield-enhanc-
ing technologies.  The combination of lower prices
and lower yield growth is critical in forecasting
whether the EU can meet GATT commitments with
the current CAP. 
Commodity Coverage, Budget Exposure, and
Farm Revenues
Commodities covered in the model include individual
grains, individual oilseeds and products, sugar, rice,
dairy products, individual livestock products, and
important feeds such as manioc and corn gluten feed,
as well as proxy index variables for other energy-rich
and protein-rich feeds.  While the coverage is not
comprehensive, the modeled commodities represent a
significant share of world trade in agriculture and
more than 50 percent of EU agricultural budget out-
lays.  
Farm income and budget constraints play particularly
important roles in the final shape of agricultural poli-
cies in Europe.  Therefore, an analytical framework is
used to capture the effects of policy changes on the
major components of the CAP budget and on farm
returns of the EU and countries that aspire to accede
to the EU.  The task for policymakers and for analysts
is an arduous one in the sense that changes in the
CAP and world price movements have effects on pro-
duction, consumption, trade, farm income, and the
budget—all of which must be reconciled with the
internal political dynamics of a rapidly widening and,
consequently, more politically and institutionally com-
plex EU. 
A comparative-static analytical framework with the
capability of generating results on an annual basis is
used to assess possible EU actions on agricultural pol-
icy.  The outcomes of the various scenarios, from
which implications are drawn for world agricultural
trade, are examined for political feasibility.  Some
changes may have to be made to the CAP if stocks,
farm incomes, budgets, or trade are unacceptable to
EU farm ministers, farmers, consumers, the EU
Commission, finance ministers, and WTO trade part-
ners.4 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
The ESIM Model 
ESIM (European Simulation Model), the model used
for the analysis, is a SuperCalc-5 spreadsheet-based,
multi-commodity, multi-regional, comparative-static,
net-trade, partial-equilibrium policy model. This study
focused on accurately modeling the agricultural and
policy environment of the EU-12 and incorporating
new and potential entrants.
ESIM contains 13 countries/regions and reproduces
total world production and trade of the modeled com-
modities (table 1).  Since the purpose of this study is
to examine the effects of EU enlargement, detailed
country and regional coverage is provided for the
European countries now in the EU as well as potential
entrants.  
Commodity coverage is very extensive.  The model
contains 28, mostly temperate zone, agricultural prod-
ucts (table 2), mostly commodities that have received
substantial support from the EU.  Two are of special
interest to the feed sector of the EU (and to U.S.
exporters)—manioc (or cassava) and corn gluten feed.
The policy-driven model contains an extensive list of
policy instruments that are used or could be used in
the future by either the EU or potential entrants (table
3).  Included in the model are commodity-specific
policies (in 12 different categories), policies that
affect all commodities, and non-commodity-specific
exogenous variables such as the exchange rate and
population and income growth rates.  The modeling
block representing the United States incorporates the
major U.S. policies (before passage of the 1996 Farm
Act) but these policies are not varied by scenario.  
The model is designed to run in a large-country mode
where world prices are endogenous.  Policy changes
in the EU, a major producer, consumer, and trader of
the commodities analyzed here, and EU enlargement
are expected to affect world prices.  Equilibrium in
the large-country mode is attained when world prices
adjust to the point where world net trade is zero for
each year of the simulation.
The model can also be used in a small-country mode
based on the assumption that world prices are exoge-
nous.  Under this assumption, one can examine the
implications of domestic policy or production/demand
conditions without feedback from world prices.  The
model was used in the small-country mode in ERS’s
baseline where world prices are given exogenously;
the EU response to those prices is determined in that
exercise.
The equations for the countries/regions are included in
a single spreadsheet.  Each country/region module in
the model contains:
1) a policy block with parameters for the relevant pol-
icy instruments and the exogenous non-commodity-
specific variables;
2) a behavioral equation block describing production,
consumption, net trade, and domestic prices; 
3) a financial calculation block where farm receipts
and budget expenditures are calculated; and 
4) an extensive parameter block (table 4).
Each country/region has an associated data file that
contains time series data4 on production, consump-
tion, prices, and policy parameters for each of the
modeled commodities.  These data are used to initial-
ize the model.  The initialized or base model thus
reproduces whichever year or average of years the
4 Data were obtained from USDA’s electronic PS&D data base.
Table 1—Countries and/or regions in ESIM 
EU-12 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,












Former centrally planned economies (excluding those
above)
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analyst thinks is representative for the analysis.  This
method of model initialization allows the analyst flex-
ibility in choosing the appropriate base year to repro-
duce.  Updating the model to a new base year as new
data are collected is relatively easy.  The results pre-
sented in this analysis for the EU-12 are based on a
model calibrated with data averaged for the 1989-91
period.  
Behavioral Equations
The model contains behavioral equations for produc-
tion, human demand, and feed demand for each com-
modity in each country/region.  Net trade is the bal-
ance of production and total use.5 A two-way interac-
tion through feeding links the crop and livestock sec-
tors:  demand for feed by the livestock sector affects
crop prices and crop production, while crop prices
affect feeding costs, which help determine levels of
livestock production.  
ESIM is not a structural model, but an analytical
framework where the behavior of economic agents is
represented, in reduced form, by elasticity parameters
that reflect adjustments to changing prices.  The elas-
ticity parameters were derived from a variety of
sources.  For the Eastern European and EFTA coun-
tries, they represent our best assessment following lit-
erature review and discussions with regional experts.
Feed demand elasticities for the EU were provided by
Jan Blom of Agricultural Economics Research
Institute (LEI-DLO), the Netherlands, as a result of a
cooperative agreement with ERS; area elasticities
were generated by Martin Johnson, formerly with
ERS; the remaining elasticities were obtained from
ERS’s US-EC Model.  The elasticity parameters are
assumed constant throughout the period of analysis,
and behavior is modeled using double-logarithmic
functional forms.  The model is specified in real terms
because all prices and exchange rates are deflated by
the CPI.  
Table 2—Commodities in ESIM 
Crops
Wheat: common wheat, durum wheat





Soybeans (meal and oil)
Rapeseed (meal and oil)






































5 As the model is used to analyze the longer-run implications of
alternative policies, stock changes are not included in the model.6 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
The behavioral equations described are specific to the
EU and new entrants upon entering the EU.  Equation
specification and policy parameters reflect the 1992
CAP reform, but do not include GATT commitments
as binding constraints on EC policies, since one
objective is to estimate the need for policy changes to
meet these commitments.
Specification of Crop Production
Crop production is calculated as the product of area
harvested times yield for the crops in all
countries/regions of the model.  Area harvested is a
function of relative prices, while yield is a function of
price and a technological growth rate based on recent
historical trends and interviews with EU farmers.
For the EU, particularly because of CAP reform, area
harvested for grains and oilseeds is not only a func-
tion of prices, but also a function of policy parame-
ters.  CAP reform reduced policy prices but provided
compensatory payments to producers of grains,
oilseeds, and protein crops; however, large producers
(those with production above 92 tons) have to set
aside a portion of their land in order to receive com-
pensation payments for the price cuts.  Thus, the
model calculates the amount of area set aside for each
of the relevant crops and the area harvested.  
The sequence for calculating area harvested in the
model is:
1) determine the desired area for each grain/oilseed
crop based on relative prices and relative compen-
sation payments, assuming set aside area is not rel-
evant;  
2) adjust area allocation for grains to take into account
small producers who do not have to set-aside land
(we assume that oilseeds are produced only by
large producers);  
3) calculate set aside area for each of the grains and
oilseed crops based on announced policy about the
set-aside rate and adjustments for small producers
and slippage; and
4) calculate actual area harvested for each crop as the
difference between the desired area harvested and
the area that is set aside.
Based on the description above, actual area harvested
is a function of relative prices, compensation pay-
ments, and the set-aside rate.  In reduced form, area
harvested for grains/oilseeds can be represented as:
Ahi =  f(P1,..., Pn, Cg, Co, SAR, AS, SF)
where:
Pn = own and cross prices, 1,...,n includes common
wheat, durum, corn, barley, other coarse grains,
soybeans, rapeseed, and sunflower seed;
Cg = grain compensation payments;
Co = oilseed compensation payments;
SAR = announced set-aside rate;
AS =  area slippage rate; and
SF = small producer adjustment.
Matrices of price elasticities reflect homogeneity and
symmetry requirements.  Compensation payments are
Table 4—ESIM schematic
Policy block Behavioral equations Budget block Parameters
Country 1:
Commodity 1
Commodity 2 Policy 1, policy 2... Production, trade, demand Export refunds, etc. Elasticities
Country 2:
Commodity 1
Commodity 2 Policy 1, policy 2... Production, trade, demand Export refunds, etc. Elasticities
Country n:
Commodity 1 Policy 1, policy 2... Production, trade, demand Export refunds, etc. Elasticities
Commodity 2Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 7
assumed partially decoupled so they do not affect
yield in the model although they do affect acreage, but
the requirement to set aside land is assumed to affect
yield.  Yield per hectare of grains/oilseeds is: 
Yi= f(Pi, YSi, T, SA}
where:
Yi = yield per hectare of grain/oilseed i;
Pi = price of grain/oilseed i;
Ysi = yield slippage factor for grain/oilseed i;
T = productivity growth factor representing techno-
logical change; and
SA = set-aside area of grain/oilseed i.
Total demand for each crop product consists of three
separable components:  human demand, feed demand,
and demand for seed.  Feed and human demand are
described more fully below.  Seed demand is simply
modeled as a function of harvested area.  For oilseeds,
demand is for crushing the seed into meal and oil; this
crush demand is a function of relative oilseed prices
and crush margins.  Meal and oil are modeled as joint
products with fixed coefficients, meaning a constant
crush or extraction rate per unit of seed crushed.
Feed Demand
In modeling feed demand, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)
Multilateral Trade Model (MTM) modeling approach
was followed by specifying a separate feed-demand
elasticity matrix for each livestock category.6 Given
prices, production of a unit of each livestock product
is assumed to require a certain amount of each type of
feed.  These feed rates are not technical feed require-
ments, but are derived from a feed-utilization matrix
and represent experts’ assessment of how total feed
demand for any particular feed ingredient is allocated
across livestock products.  Each feed rate is further
assumed a function of relative prices as follows: 
Livestock prices are not a factor in determining feed
rates.  Expansion or contraction of livestock produc-
tion, although affecting total feed demand, does not
affect feed per unit of output, whereas a change in rel-
ative feed prices does affect the feed rate.  Feed prices
influence livestock production in the model through
feed costs per unit of livestock production.
Twelve feed ingredients are included in the model, so
each livestock category contains a 12 x 12  elasticity
matrix, resulting in 144 elasticity parameters for each
livestock product.  Since 5 livestock categories were
included in the model, a total of 720 feed-demand
elasticity parameters were required.  Some elasticity
parameters are zero because not all feed ingredients
are fed to each livestock category.  In addition, sym-
metry and homogeneity are imposed, which reduces
the number of elasticity parameters needed.  
Total feed demand for feed ingredient i is:
Livestock Production
In the livestock sector, production is a function of the
relative prices of livestock commodities, feed costs,
and exogenous technological growth rates as follows:
Lvj =  f(P1,...,Pk, FCj, T)
where:
Lvj = production of livestock j ( j = 1, 2,..5);
P1,...,Pk = prices of livestock commodities;
FCj = feed cost of livestock j; and
T = productivity growth factor representing disem-
bodied technological change.
6 For a general description of the MTM model, see OECD,
National Policies and Agricultural Trade,  Paris, 1987, pp. 136-
185.  The feed demand component used in the MTM model and
assumed elasticities are described in more detail in OECD docu-
ment DAA/1926-TD/85.262, Paris, September 17, 1985.
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Feed cost per unit for each livestock commodity is a
function of feed rates and feed prices as follows:
Interactions between the crop and livestock sectors are
achieved through feed-demand and feeding-rate rela-
tions.  Feed prices affect not only the composition of
the feed mix, but also the production of livestock
products.  Thus, not only are the substitution and
complementary effects of changing relative prices and
shifts among feed ingredients represented in the
model, but the expansion or contraction effects on the
livestock sector are also captured by changing feed
costs.
Consumption Demand
Human demand for goods is a function of relative
product prices, population, and income:
Di = f(P1,P2,...Pm, Pop., Inc.)
where:
Di = demand for product i;
P1,...Pm = own and cross prices of goods; 
Pop. = population growth rate; and
Inc. = income growth rate.
Matrices of price and income elasticities reflect homo-
geneity and symmetry requirements.  For each com-
modity in the model, net trade is the difference
between production and total demand:
NTi = PRODi - TDi
where:
NTi = net trade;
PRODi = production (area times yield); and
TDi = total demand (feed plus human plus seed).
In addition to determining production, consumption,
and net trade, the model calculates the financial impli-
cations of various policy options, with a focus on cal-
culating financial returns to growers through market
operations (farm receipts) and the public budget
implications of export refunds and compensation pay-
ments.  
Policy analysis is undertaken by changing the policy
block described above.  The policy block for any
country/region or group of countries/regions can be
changed directly in the model file (if the model is run
for only 1 year), or one can use the special program-
ming file which contains the macro and policy data
files to perform policy analysis (if the model is run for
a sequence of years).  A set of policy files with policy
assumptions up to the year 2005 was developed for
each of the 5 EFTA countries, each of the 4 CEEC
countries, and for the EU-12.  Special programming
macro files simulated the model for a sequence of
years (up to 2005) or for any one year of interest.7
Policy files for the EU accession candidates were pre-
pared so that both the year of accession and the period
during which candidates’ policies are aligned with
those of the EU can be specified.  Acceding countries’
decisions on adoption of production quotas (for milk
and sugar), compensation payments, and set aside
may also be specified in the model. 
The rest of the report presents the results of the vari-
ous scenarios described above, organized to highlight
the effects of the various scenarios on the EU-12 and
on the accession candidates. 
7 The model is available from the authors upon request.
where:
FC = cost index of feeding livestock j;
FR = feed rate for feed input i going to livestock j;
     and









jEconomic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 9
EU-12 Market Balances Under 1992
CAP Reform and EU Enlargement
Our period of study, 1989-2005, includes the incorpo-
ration of Austria, Finland, and Sweden into the EU, as
well as the likely incorporation of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the terms
Visegrad-4 or CEEC-4 are used interchangeably to
refer to these countries) at the turn of the century.
The principal assumption affecting scenario results for
the EU-12 is the implementation of 1992 CAP reform,
which we do not discuss at length because its provi-
sions are well known.  Among major commodities,
dairy and sugar production quotas preclude scenario
effects, while the EU’s relatively minuscule rice pro-
duction was materially unaffected by 1992 CAP
reform.  The dairy herd, however, is considered
because it affects feed demand, and the price of butter
is cut by 2.5 percent as stipulated by CAP reform.  
The assumption that undergirds scenarios 1-3 is that
the CAP does not change as new entrants join the EU.
Only in scenario 4 are policy prices reduced to simu-
late a policy response intended to mitigate the bud-
getary impacts of CEEC-4 membership.  In addition,
reactions to GATT commitments on import access and
export constraints are not incorporated into the analy-
sis.  Nevertheless, the results are compared to likely
GATT commitments to see what EU commodities are
affected.  Lower policy prices and lower yields are
then discussed where GATT constraints are exceeded.  
The most important developments that occur in the
EU-12 as a result of EU enlargement revolve around
the budget costs of incorporating the CEEC-4 into the
EU (scenario 3).  Incorporating the EFTA countries
into the EU (scenarios 1 and 2) has little effect on the
EU-12.  Here various policy scenarios and technology
developments, examined in the EU-12 context, might
allow the EU to absorb the CEEC-4 without depleting
the budget.  In scenario 4 (further CAP reform sce-
nario), EU policy prices, in real terms, are arbitrarily
reduced by 5 percent from 1997-1999 and then
reduced again 1 percent annually to the year 2005.
Because of lower prices, the yield growth rate for
most field crops in scenario 4a is reduced by 1.7 per-
cent annually from 1995 through 2005. 
Grains
The primary force driving grain production from
1989-2005 is CAP reform, which brought lower grain
prices and invoked land set-aside.  Grain production
in the EU-12 is affected little by the different enlarge-
ment scenarios (table 5).  Results from all scenarios
are presented but the contrast between the base sce-
nario and scenario 4 is emphasized.
While lower prices and discrimination between large
and small producers in the reformed CAP is argued by
some as inducing technological change, enlargement
is not assumed to affect technological progress in the
EU-12 in the model.  Consequently, yield growth for
each grain continues at a constant, pre-determined8
rate through time, just one possible assumption made
in the model.  The effects of CAP reform on future
research expenditures and on yield developments are
difficult to know.  One possible outcome of lower
prices, slower yield growth due to less technical
progress, is shown in scenario 4a.  
In the base scenario, total EU-12 grain production in
1995 is about 5 percent below the base period produc-
tion level (average of 1989-1991) because of lower
prices and the implementation of land set-aside due to
CAP reform (table 5).9
By the year 2000, grain production recovers despite
lower prices and land set-aside because of the offset-
ting effect of yield growth due to technological
progress.  Total grain production is about 5 percent
higher than the base period level and 10 percent above
1995 levels.  
Grain production for the years 2000-2005 in the base
scenario continues to increase, and in the year 2005 is
15 percent above the base period level, even though
the assumptions that prices are lower and set-aside
continues at the original CAP reform rate of 15 per-
8 In response to CAP reform, the yield growth rate for most
grains was reduced below the historical trend but was not adjusted
further during the simulation period.
9 Actual grain output in 1995 was about 2 percent higher than
indicated by the model, primarily because actual producer prices
fell less than the announced reductions that were used in the
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cent are maintained.  Throughout the model, produc-
tivity growth overwhelms the effects of policy
changes (lower prices and land set-aside) instituted
early in the simulation period and adds an additional
34 million tons of grain to the base period level at the
end of the 10-year period in 2005 for all scenarios
except scenario 4. 
Results for scenarios 1 and 2 follow a pattern almost
identical to the base scenario, not surprising because
the EFTA countries are not large enough producers to
affect the EU-12 market balances, and grain produc-
tion is driven by CAP policy prices, which are not
adjusted in these scenarios. 
Wheat production in 1995 for the EU-12 in the base
scenario is 6 percent below the base period (1989-91)
level but by the year 2005 is 15 percent above the
base period level.  These results are more optimistic
than some other studies regarding the effectiveness of
CAP reform.  For example, these ESIM results sug-
gest that by the year 2000 wheat production is almost
90 million tons, whereas a recent OECD report places
wheat production around 98 million tons, about 9 per-
cent higher.  Wheat production results in ESIM (with
the exception of scenario 4) reach 98 million tons 5
years later, in 2005.
Lower prices brought about by the 1992 CAP reform
induce greater domestic use of grain.  In 1995, total
grain use is about 7 percent above utilization during
the base period, but total use increases only moderate-
ly (2.1 percent) during the rest of the simulation peri-
od.  By the year 2000, total use is 9 percent higher
than in the base period, and in 2005 it is 12 percent
higher.  The relatively modest growth in total use is
attributed to modest population and income growth, a
slight decline in real feed prices, and a relatively stag-
nant livestock sector (table 6).  
The combination of lower grain output and higher
domestic use early in the simulation reduces EU-12
grain exports in the base scenario.  Model results indi-
cate that total net grain exports in 1995 are down to
about 6 million tons, not including exports sourced
from stocks.  Yet the relatively strong rebound in pro-
duction and slow growth in domestic use lead to
increasing EU-12 grain exports in the following years.
By 2005, net grain exports, about 36 million tons, are
48 percent above the base period.  Net exports of
Table 5—EU-12 grain production, consumption, and net trade under alternative scenarios from
1989/91 to 2005
Year Base scenario Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Million tons
Production
1989/91 173.20 173.20 173.20 173.20
1995 164.63 164.63 164.63 164.63
2000 181.15 181.10 181.04 177.56
2005 198.79 198.79 198.71 194.55
Consumption
1989/91 148.70 148.70 148.70 148.70
1995 159.11 161.49 161.36 161.46
2000 161.94 164.19 161.66 163.58
2005 162.52 165.23 162.56 164.14
Net trade
1989/91 24.51 24.51 24.51 24.51
1995 5.53 3.17 3.17 3.19
2000 19.21 16.83 19.33 13.98
2005 36.27 33.45 36.53 30.41
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wheat increase from 6 million tons (not including
exports sourced from stocks) in 1995 to 25 million
tons in 2005; coarse grain net exports increase to 11
million tons during the same period. This pattern
holds in all scenarios except in scenario 4 where
exports are lower.  
These results suggest that the EU-12 will have diffi-
culty meeting its GATT commitments for grain
exports beginning around the year 2001 unless addi-
tional policy changes are made.  These results are
similar to those generated by other models.  For
example, the OECD projects that in 2000, EU-12 net
wheat exports will be about 28 million tons, assuming
the EU-12 maintains 12 million tons in stocks.  Our
model (which also assumes constant stocks, which in
turn explain low 1995 exports) returns more opti-
mistic results regarding the effectiveness of CAP
reform, and indicates wheat exports of 15 million tons
in 2000. 
Scenario 4 generates expected results—lower grain
prices lead to lower output, higher feeding rates, and
lower exports relative to the base scenario.  In 2005,
wheat production is 3 percent lower than in the base
scenario, while barley and corn production are 2 per-
cent below base scenario levels.  Total domestic use
expands as a result of lower prices, mainly due to an
increase in feed demand.  Consequently, EU-12
exportable surpluses decline relative to the base sce-
nario. 
Net wheat exports of 12 million tons in 2000 in sce-
nario 4 are below EU-12 GATT commitments.
However, export surpluses build up quickly and,
although lower prices result in lower exports in 2005
relative to the base scenario, EU-12 wheat exports rise
above GATT commitment levels of 16.3 million met-
ric tons for wheat and 8.1 million metric tons for
coarse grains.  For example, in 2005, EU-12 wheat
exports reach 20 million tons and coarse grain exports
are about 10 million tons in scenario 4.  
EU-12 budget costs are lower in Scenario 4, which
leads to slightly higher compensation payments, but
total budget expenditures on grains decline, mainly
because of lower export refunds resulting from lower
exports.  In scenario 4, export refunds fall almost 77
percent in 2005 relative to the base scenario.  Total
budget expenditures for grains are 9 percent less than
Table 6—EU-12 meat production, consumption, and net trade effects under alternative scenarios,
1989/91-2005
Year Base scenario Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Beef Pork Poultry Beef Pork Poultry Beef Pork Poultry
Million tons
Production
1989/91 8.15 13.87 6.49 8.15 13.87 6.49 8.15 13.87 6.49
1995 7.90 14.11 7.03 7.93 14.52 7.10 7.93 14.52 7.10
2000 8.26 14.41 7.60 8.25 14.03 7.71 7.95 13.97 7.71
2005 8.61 14.37 7.82 8.60 13.92 8.09 8.29 13.87 8.02
Consumption
1989/91 7.52 13.36 6.17 7.52 13.36 6.17 7.52 13.36 6.17
1995 8.10 13.60 6.72 8.12 13.56 6.71 8.12 13.56 6.71
2000 8.38 13.91 7.29 8.37 13.99 7.26 8.69 13.92 7.30
2005 8.43 13.86 7.51 8.42 13.97 7.43 8.74 13.89 7.49
Net trade
1989/91 .63 .51 .31 .63 .51 .31 .63 .51 .31
1995 -.20 .51 .31 -.20 .96 .39 -.20 .96 .39
2000 -.13 .51 .31 -.12 .03 .46 -.74 .05 .42
2005 .18 .51 .31 .18 .06 .66 -.44 -.02 .53
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in the base scenario.  Scenario 4, although beneficial
for EU-12 consumers, taxpayers, and livestock pro-
ducers because of lower grain prices and lower budget
expenditures, adversely affects grain producers.  Farm
receipts for grain producers are 12 percent lower than
in the base scenario in 2005.  In this case, only com-
pensation payments and export refunds are taken into
account for budget expenditures—intervention buy-
ing, storage payments, and structural funds are not
accounted for here.
The results suggest that CAP reform, as modeled, is
insufficient to meet GATT commitments in the latter
part of the simulation period even with significantly
lower prices and lower than historic yield growth
rates.  The additional 10-percent price cut represented
by scenario 4, although helpful in moderating budget
pressures, is not sufficient to solve the problem of
meeting GATT export restrictions.  Therefore, further
EU policy adjustments would have to be introduced.
One of the key parameters embedded in the analysis,
as suggested above, is productivity growth, reflected
in the model by annual yield increases.  The results
presented above assume that productivity growth is
not affected by CAP reform.10 However, research and
development (R&D) expenditures may fall because of
CAP reform, adversely affecting yield growth in the
future.  Additionally, some argue that the emphasis of
future R&D will no longer focus strictly on yield-
enhancing technologies, but will shift to quality
and/or environmental considerations.
These considerations are incorporated in the analysis
through changes in future yield growth rates assumed
in scenario 4a.  Current technology in the pipeline is
assumed to continue; hence, early in the simulation
period, yield growth does not change from current
trends.  Less R&D is assumed, which is reflected in
slowing yield growth by 1998.  Yield growth for rape-
seed is not lowered from initial levels to reflect recent
developments in hybrid seeds.
Starting in 1998, the yield growth rate for grains and
oilseeds is assumed to decline by about 1.7 percent
per year, so that, by 2005, annual yield growth is 11
percent below the yield growth in the base scenario
(from 2.09 percent to 1.85 percent).  In order to dis-
cern the effects of the assumed lower yield growth on
supply and distribution, the base scenario was run
again with the lower yield growth rates and the results
are referred to as base-a.
Total grain production in the year 2005 is 3 percent
less in base-a than in the base scenario.  Total use is
affected little, but the lower output reduces net
exports in base-a compared with the base scenario.
For example, wheat exports are 14 percent less and
coarse grain exports are 27 percent less in base-a than
in the base scenario.  But even with the lower
assumed yield growth, EU-12 wheat exports, at 21
million tons, are above the subsidized export levels
(16.3 million tons) permitted under GATT.  Lower
yield growth rates reduce grain surpluses somewhat,
but not sufficiently.  Results suggest that even when
CAP reform is assumed to result in moderation of
future yield growth, the EU-12 will still produce more
than can be exported with subsidies under GATT
commitments.
The assumption that CAP reform induces technologi-
cal changes that moderate the outward shift of grain
supply schedules is beneficial to the budget.
Primarily because of reduced export refunds, budget
expenditures for grains in base-a are about 4 percent
below the base scenario.  However, lower output leads
to reduced marketing, and the net result is about a 2-
percent fall in total receipts for grain producers.
The combination of lower prices and slower yield
growth (scenario 4a) leads to further reductions in
grain output and considerably lower supply available
for export.  In the year 2005, total grain output is 3
percent below scenario 4 and 5 percent below the base
scenario.  Lower grain prices result in about 4 million
fewer tons of grain produced, while lower yield
growth eliminates an additional 6 million tons.  In
scenario 4a, net wheat exports in 2005 are about 18
million tons, almost 28 percent below the exports in
the base scenario.  In this case, the EU-12 is consider-
ably closer to meeting GATT commitments on subsi-
dized wheat exports.  These results suggest that the 10 Yields do respond to lower prices—only the technical element
in yields is assumed exogenous.Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 13
EU-12 will experience difficulties meeting GATT
commitments early in the next decade unless:
1) CAP reform induces technological changes that
moderate the growth in grain yields;
2) further price cuts are instituted; and 
3) the 15 percent set-aside is retained.
The international grain-exporting community is not
the sole beneficiary of the EU’s pursuing a policy of
lower prices that slow yield growth.  Benefits also
accrue to EU consumers, livestock producers, and tax-
payers.  Budget expenditures on grains are 9 percent
less in scenario 4a than in  the base scenario, primari-
ly because export refunds decline by 90 percent.  This
policy, however, adversely affects grain producers as
farm receipts are about 13 percent less than in the
base scenario.
Oilseeds and Oilmeals
Imports of oilseeds by the EU-12 first increase by 3
million tons over the base period to the year 2000
then remain relatively stagnant through the year 2005
in the base scenario. Oilmeal imports into the EU-12
suffer a sharp decline throughout the 10-year period in
all scenarios.  Forces on the production and consump-
tion side simultaneously bring this about.  On the pro-
duction side, additional output of rapeseed and sun-
seed on set-aside land along with technical growth of
EU-12 oilseed yields results in expanded domestic
availability.  On the demand side, the following forces
are operating to lower demand:  a smaller dairy herd,
a slightly higher price for oilmeals, greater feeding
efficiency, lower pork production, and lower prices
for meal substitutes in feeding—grains and corn
gluten feed (CGF).  
Very little change other than technical growth factors
occurs in rapeseed and sunseed production in all sce-
narios in the EU-12 because of limitations, imposed
by the Blair House agreement, on the area planted to
oilseeds. Oilseed acreage is limited to 4.36 million
hectares but the agreement allows the EU to grow
oilseeds, for industrial use, equivalent to 1 million
metric tons of soymeal on set-aside land. The agree-
ment thus allows the EU to produce a significant
amount of oilmeals derived from extrusion of the oil
that can be used only for industrial purposes.
However, since the EU reaches the maximum level of
1 million tons of soymeal equivalent in all scenarios,
the Blair House agreement’s effects are not a factor in
determining production differences between scenarios.
Livestock Markets
Livestock and livestock products are politically sensi-
tive in the EU-12 because of CAP budget costs and
the large number of small livestock producers with
strong political connections.  Grain producers are also
affected in part because meat exports are another way
of exporting EU grains.  The demand for grain from
the livestock sector will greatly affect 
1) the amount of grains available for sale on the world
market,
2) the size of the grain stockpiles in the EU-12, and
3) the EU-12 budget.
The prices of inputs and outputs in the feed/livestock
sector under different scenarios will determine to a
great extent the competitiveness of EU and CEEC
production and hence the trade between the two
regions and with the rest of the world.  The most rele-
vant scenario to examine is scenario 3, in which the
CEEC-4 join the EU. 
The most important commodity effects caused by
CEEC-4 accession to the EU for the EU-12 is the fall
in pork production and exports, the increase in poultry
production and exports (table 6), and the negative
effect on feed demand.  Inclusion of the CEEC-4 into
the EU exerts downward pressure on pork prices in
the EU-12 because of the increased supply in the
CEEC-4 resulting from higher prices when the four
countries are admitted to the EU.  However, for EU-
12 pork producers (and consumers), prices are low-
ered, which reduces production and expands con-
sumption, thus reducing export availability.  EU-12
pork production, in 2005, is 450,000  metric tons less
in scenario 3 than in the base scenario, while con-
sumption is slightly higher, resulting in the EU-12
reducing exports from 500,000 tons to about 6,000
tons.  These results will be discussed in more detail
below, but it appears that CEEC-4 countries have a
relative advantage in pork production and there is a14 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
moderate eastward shift in the location of pork pro-
duction in the expanded EU.  
With enlargement forcing pork production down (sce-
nario 3 vs. the base scenario) and poultry production
up in the EU-12, total feed demand in the EU-12 is
lower in scenario 3.  A primary reason is that pork
production requires about 60 percent more feed per
pound produced than poultry. As a result, the model
projects the EU-12 will feed fewer grains and meals
after the CEEC-4 join the CAP, which leads to larger
EU-12 grain exports and smaller oilmeal imports.
In contrast to pork, poultry production increases in the
EU-12 as a result of CEEC-4 accession.  Poultry pro-
ducers experience a slight increase in the producer
price with scenario 3 relative to the base scenario,
which leads to expanding poultry production, decreas-
ing consumption, and larger exports.  By the year
2005 in the EU-12, as a result of CEEC-4 accession,
poultry production  is 3-percent higher, consumption
is slightly lower, and exports are 660,000 tons, more
than double those in the base scenario.  These results
do not indicate that CEEC-4 accession leads to an
increase in relative advantage in poultry production by
the EU-12.  Instead, these exports are facilitated by
the use of export subsidies.  
The sensitivity of pork and poultry exports to relative-
ly small percentage changes in the production and
consumption sectors clearly demonstrates how
volatile and unanticipated EU-12 exports can be.  The
CEEC-4’s entrance into these markets dramatically
affects the EU-12’s export market, which has been the
residual market for EU-12 overproduction.  The sig-
nificance of these results is of particular importance to
world markets because 
1) the EU could export more pork and beef under the
Uruguay Round constraints if EU prices were
allowed to drop to world levels because of low-cost
producers in the CEEC’s, and
2) the political fallout in the EU-12 regions, where
farmers are unable to compete with low-cost CEEC
production, could provoke a revisit of CAP reform.   
The whole story cannot be told within the confines of
any single livestock product.  The CEEC-4 produce,
consume, and trade all livestock products and will
face different input costs and output prices for their
products if they come under the CAP.  Competition
from the CEEC-4 would have serious political conse-
quences for the CAP because traditional producers of
northern products such as pork and beef in the EU-12
would likely see their profit margins squeezed or
would be forced out of business.  The likelihood of
this occurring appears strong given the results of the
model and the fact that labor costs are lower in the
CEEC-4 than in the EU-12, giving them a further
advantage in livestock production, particularly in pork
production.  However, the EU’s  legislative barriers to
the production of pigs, environmental requirements
and licensing, could prevent some farms in the CEEC-
4 from producing pigs once they are members. 
The CEEC-4 countries have requested funds from the
EU to invest in infrastructure that would allow them
to comply with EU regulations.  A timetable for com-
pliance with EU regulations by CEEC-4 farms could
provide the EU-12 with a valid base from which to
extend the same assistance to EU-12 farms that would
be rendered unprofitable by CEEC-4 competition.  
Summary
Under any scenario, the EU will violate the export
provisions of the Uruguay Round agreement in cereals
if it maintains its current policy system.  This conclu-
sion is reached even with the assumption that the EU
will continue its set-aside rate at 15 percent, estab-
lished by the 1992 CAP reform.  The EU, in response
to higher world prices, reduced its set-aside rate to 10
percent for the 1994/95 season and lowered it further
to 5 percent for the 1995/96 and 1996/97 marketing
years, and may even reduce it to zero, which would
create surpluses sooner and larger than predicted by
the model results.  However, with high world prices in
1996 and 1997, EU export subsidies are greatly
reduced, avoiding potential problems in the EU’s abil-
ity to meet its GATT commitments in the near term.
What seems clear in the medium term is that the CAP
will have to be re-reformed in order to incorporate the
Visegrad-4 countries into the EU.  This will entail
very difficult political decisions because of:Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 15
1) the tight budgetary situation created by macroeco-
nomic policies in the run-up to the creation of the
single currency;
2) the need to mollify current EU farmers whose
livelihoods and incomes will be threatened by com-
petition from low-cost producers in Eastern Europe;
and
3) equitable treatment of farmers in East and West
Europe regarding compensation payments, set-aside
land, quotas, and national aids.
In addition, the countries of Eastern Europe will likely
drive a hard bargain in the negotiating process
because agriculture plays such a large role in their
economies and especially the political life of their
countries. These issues and proposals for solutions
will be discussed below.16 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
The Impact of EFTA Accession
Introduction
On January 1, 1995, the European Union (EU) was
enlarged to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden, for-
merly members of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA).  The governments of these coun-
tries successfully negotiated with the EU the terms of
membership, and their electorates had given their
approval in national referenda.  A fourth EFTA coun-
try, Norway, also negotiated the terms of accession for
membership, as it had in 1972 when the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined, but the voters
once again rejected the proposed accession.  
This section discusses the impact of the enlargement
to include the three new member states, describes the
importance of agriculture in these countries, details
the issues faced in the negotiations and their resolu-
tion, indicates the implications for agriculture of the
accession of three countries, and discusses possible
options for two of the members of EFTA, Norway and
Switzerland, that have not yet joined the EU.  
The EFTA and Agricultural Trade
In July 1956, at a time of intensive negotiations on the
future trade relations in post-war Europe, the UK sug-
gested the formation of a free-trade area (FTA) for all
the countries of Western Europe.  The FTA would
have included the six eventual founding members of
the European Economic Community, France, Italy,
Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, known as the Six.  The Six were not
convinced that a mere free-trade area would be satis-
factory; such an area did not hold out the promise of
the closer political relationships that they sought, par-
ticularly between France and West Germany.
Moreover, the six distrusted the UK’s insistence that
such an FTA exclude agriculture (to preserve the ben-
efits of Commonwealth Preferences for their overseas
suppliers) and they continued the negotiations that
lead to the Rome Treaty.11  
Several other countries, including Greece, Turkey, and
Iceland, were also wary of the notion of a free trade
area.  But the UK and six other countries, Norway,
Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, and Denmark
(the Outer Seven), pursued the FTA option, leading to
the signing of the Stockholm Treaty of 1960 and the
formation of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA).  
The Stockholm Treaty was heavily influenced by con-
temporary British trade policy.  To avoid any threat to
imports of agricultural products from the
Commonwealth, the British government argued for
the exclusion of these products from the Agreement.
The Stockholm Treaty therefore contained an explicit
statement that the trade liberalization provisions
would not apply to agriculture and to fisheries
(Articles 21 and 26).  Though the original reasons for
this exclusion are no longer relevant, the legacy still
remains; EFTA was always an incomplete free-trade
area because it omitted these two important sectors of
the economy.  
Yet some bilateral arrangements made between
Denmark and the rest of the EFTA facilitate the
export of farm products.  The UK also agreed to allow
some imports of fish products from EFTA partners,
subject to minimum-import prices, in the late 1960’s.
Some duties on agricultural products were bound in
1966 and market access improved in 1971, but EFTA
was never willing or able to tackle the agricultural
anomaly. 
The result of this hands-off treatment of agriculture
was the development of a series of national markets in
the EFTA countries behind high border protection and
extensive price supports.  Trade among the Nordic
countries in agricultural products has been lower than
might be expected, given their common borders and
cultural ties.12 Trade between these national markets
and the former European Community (EC) countries
has also been much less than the logic of relative fac-
tor endowments would suggest.  This situation is like-
ly to change markedly by membership in the EU.
11 For a discussion of this period see Michael Tracy,  Government
and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1880-1988, Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1990.
12 Austria and Switzerland, however, both have longer borders
with Italy and Germany than with each other.  Agricultural trade
between Austria and Switzerland is not and may never be exten-
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The decision to exclude agricultural goods was made
at the time when a series of bilateral trade pacts devel-
oped among the EFTA countries and the EC, follow-
ing the movement of the UK and Denmark from
EFTA to the EC in 1973.  Given former EFTA mem-
bers’ reluctance to re-erect trade barriers among for-
mer EFTA members, negotiations for a free trade
agreement between the former EFTA partners and the
EC looked probable, but in agriculture and fisheries
the issue did not arise.  No new barriers were erected
on farm products as no preferences were eroded.
Swiss farm exports, for example,  were not allowed
free access into the UK market under EFTA rules, so
they suffered no loss with UK accession to the EC.  It
was the UK’s Commonwealth Preference system,
rather than EFTA preferences, that had to adjust most
in the area of agricultural trade when the UK joined
the EC.
Whether the EC-EFTA bilaterals could have included
agriculture is uncertain.  The EC had by that time
developed the Common Agricultural Policy, which
coupled trade liberalization within the EC with a
restrictive system for controlling third-country
imports.  The protectionist face of the CAP toward
third countries was not the main problem.  Austria,
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Finland (made a full
EFTA member in 1969), Iceland (which joined in
1970), and Portugal all had restrictive regimes for
farm trade.  The difficult issue would have been trade
within the EC-EFTA bloc, rather than with third coun-
tries.  
EFTA countries could hardly have been expected to
have adopted the CAP; the loss of control of rural pol-
icy, seen as crucial to national security and social pol-
icy in several of these countries, was too much to
expect of nonmembers. The full set of regulations
governing agricultural marketing, together with a
sharing of the financial burden and the need to harmo-
nize prices,  would have been too much to impose on
the EFTA countries.  But without some fairly exten-
sive revision of EFTA policies in this area, intra-
European free trade in farm products would have been
out of the question.
The ambitious plans laid in 1985 by the EC to “com-
plete the domestic market by the end of 1992” posed a
problem for EFTA.  The economic case for being
inside this large internal market was compelling, yet
the political difficulties of membership, in particular
the issue of neutrality and the opposition of the Soviet
Union, argued for staying outside.  As a response to
this dilemma the EC developed the notion of a
European Economic Area (EEA) which would include
both the EC and EFTA, where trade in goods and ser-
vices could be free and where factors could move
without restriction.  The talks aimed at establishing an
EEA took the same approach on agriculture as in the
earlier bilaterals.  Rather than open up the question of
trade in agricultural products, both the EC and EFTA
agreed that it be left off the table.  This decision was
questioned by Spain, which would have gained from
better access into the affluent nations of EFTA for
Mediterranean products. But rather than open up the
whole “can of worms,” participating countries decided
to avoid the issue.  
Agriculture was, as a result, among the very few sec-
tors that were not already closely integrated between
EC and EFTA.13 A series of preferential quotas was
included in the EEA, which only served to highlight
the current fragmented nature of the market for many
agricultural goods in EFTA.14 Agriculture plays a
small and diminishing part in the EFTA economies.  It
was politically easy, and feasible from an administra-
tive perspective, to rule all farm trade beyond the
scope of the free trade provisions of the EEA.15
The long-term economic viability of such a decision
was always in doubt.  As the impact of integration
began to be felt, many imagined potential anomalies
that could have called the decision into question.
These problems were likely to arise most clearly
through developments in the European food industry.
Unlike the small size of the farm sector, the food
industry of the EFTA countries is one of the largest in
the European economy.  This industry is undergoing a
13 Fisheries is another sector where EFTA-EC trade is not subject
to common rules.
14 The quotas allowed limited tariff-free access to a number of
fruits and vegetables along with some cheese, processed meats
and cut flowers.  See USDA/ERS, Western Europe Agriculture
and Trade Report 1992, p. 82, for details.
15 This did, however, compromise the position of EFTA and the
EEA within the GATT.  Article XXIV of GATT states that a free
trade area must cover essentially all trade.18 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
process of rapid adjustment, including internal struc-
tural change, and closer integration among countries,
leading the food industry to increase pressure for the
removal of anomalies that prevent these firms from
seeking the cheapest source of supply for raw materi-
als in a competitive European food market.16
Negotiations for Membership
Whether or not the EEA was a satisfactory solution to
the fragmentation of the European agricultural market
was never tested.  Events in the late 1980’s and early
1990’s overtook the EEA, as first Austria and then
Finland and Sweden announced their intention to
apply for membership in the EC, encouraged in par-
ticular by the fall of the Berlin Wall and by the weak-
ening of the longstanding neutrality argument against
membership.  Norway soon followed, leaving the
EEA an empty shell.17  Membership negotiations start-
ed in February 1993 with Austria, Finland, and
Sweden, and with Norway just 2 months later.
The key principle of any EC enlargement negotiation
has been that new members accept the “acquis com-
munautaire,” the body of agreed EC law and practice,
and that the Community make such changes in the
wording of legislation that will incorporate the new
members without altering the policy.  In practice this
principle is breached in two respects:
1) the application of detailed regulations to new mem-
bers does require fresh interpretation and policy
decisions, and 
2) the new members bring with them political con-
straints that must be recognized for the negotiations
to succeed.
The first step in the process of enlargement (following
an application) is an opinion (“avis”) from the
Commission that attempts to highlight potential prob-
lems for Community policy (and by implication for
the applicant).  In the cases of Austria, Sweden,
Finland, and Norway, the Commission’s “avis” was
encouraging.18 The negotiations for entry began with
an examination of the “acquis” to highlight those parts
of the legislation where change was needed.  In this
process, the applicants also noted those aspects of the
legislation that might prove difficult for their own
political process.  These latter points were the basis
for more detailed negotiations, starting in the summer
of 1993.  The content of this list of reservations large-
ly determined the ease with which the negotiations
were to be completed.
In principle, each application for membership leads to
a negotiation between the Commission (on behalf of
the Community) and the individual applicant country.
In practice, many of the issues are common to each
applicant, and there were significant cross-linkages
among the different sets of negotiations.  This was
particularly true for applicants with agricultural issues
in the remote and mountainous regions.  
Negotiations were concluded in March 1994 and the
Accession Treaties were signed in June.  In each of
the applicant countries, the decision as to whether to
accept the negotiated terms was put to a referendum.
Agriculture played a major role in the debate on mem-
bership in each applicant.  
In general, farm groups were strongly opposed in
Norway and less adamantly against membership in
Finland and Austria.  Only Swedish farmers, who had
seen supports decline prior to accession, could see any
merit in joining the EU, though even there sentiment
was mixed.  Austrian voters gave EU accession a
clear endorsement in June 1994 by a 67-percent
majority.  This was followed in the fall of 1994 by
positive though not overwhelming votes in Finland
(57 percent in favor) and Sweden (52 percent in
favor) and a fairly narrow negative decision (52 per-
cent against) by the voters in Norway.  The agricultur-
al issue was indeed one of the major reasons why
Norwegian voters rejected membership, with heavy
majorities against the EU in rural areas, in particular
in the north.
18 As an example of a negative “avis,” the Commission reported
on the Turkish application in much more guarded tones and rec-
ommended against the start of accession talks.
16 Under both EFTA and EEA rules, protection is allowed for the
agricultural component of processed agricultural goods where the
costs differ between countries. This tends to reinforce the isola-
tion of national food firms.
17 The EEA is now comprised of the EU, Norway, Iceland, and
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The speed of the negotiations for EU accession by
four of the EFTA countries was possible largely
because of the existence of a set of free-trade agree-
ments between those countries and the EC.  In most
areas of commercial policy, including services, the
EEA already obliged the EFTA countries to line up
with the EC.  Thus the main economic advantage of
membership for the EFTA countries was to gain a
voice, as full members, in setting rules and regulations
for the commercial market in which they were already
players.  
Agriculture in the EFTA Countries
Agriculture in the EFTA countries operates under con-
ditions notably less favorable than in the much of the
rest of the EU.  In the Nordic countries, short growing
periods lead to low crop yields, and livestock has to
be housed inside for much of the year.  Transport
costs are high, both for inputs purchased by farmers
and for products sold on the market.  The terrain is
often difficult, the size of the local market usually
small, and the structure of production (except in
southern Sweden) is not conducive to scale
economies.  In the Alpine areas, altitude and slope
combine to make mechanized farming difficult,
though the influx of tourists provides a buoyant local
market.  Some of the main features of the agriculture
of these countries are shown in tables 7-9.
The different issues which kept agriculture to the fore-
front of the negotiations in each country are intro-
duced below. 
Austria
Austria, the first EFTA country to apply for member-
ship in the EU, has extensive trade ties with the
Union, and rather few trade links with other EFTA
countries.  Politically and culturally it feels itself to be
a part of Western Europe, albeit sharing with its east-
ern neighbors the experience of Soviet occupation
after the war.  Austria is a relatively small and affluent
country, with a population of 7.8 million and an aver-
age income of 22,000 ECU’s per head (compared to
the EU average of 18,000 ECU’s).  
Assimilation into the broader EU will pose few prob-
lems for Austria.  Among the main issues in the mem-
bership debate were the fragile Alpine environment,
the ability of the Austrian government to continue to
pay direct subsidies to small farmers, the competitive-
ness of the Austrian food processing industry, and the
widespread concern about uncontrolled growth of traf-
fic across the mountain passes. 
Agriculture in Austria is not a major industry, but is
deemed vulnerable to competition from abroad and
vital to the health of the tourist sector in the Alpine
areas.  The farm sector employs about 6 percent of the
labor force, but generates only 3 percent of GDP.
Protection has come both in the form of price sup-
ports, maintained by border controls, and through
closely regulated domestic marketing, favoring small
local firms and cooperatives.  Under the Austrian
model of economic policy, the government and farm
organizations work closely together to ensure employ-
ment in rural areas and to support incomes, resulting
in a sector not well structured to face direct competi-
tion.  
Table 7—Population, GDP, and shares of agriculture in EFTA applicants for EU membership
Agricultural Share in GDP Share of ag.
Country Population labor force labor force GDP per capita in GDP
Million 1,000 Percent Bill. ECU 1,000 ECU Percent
Austria 7.8 208 6.1 170.5 21.9 2.9
Finland 5.0 205 7.0 114.0 22.8 3.0
Norway 4.2 112 5.2 104.8 24.9 3.0
Sweden 8.5 106 1.9 193.2 22.7 1.4
Switzerland 6.7 240 4.1 224.5 33.5 3.2
EC-12 325.3 9,019 6.6 5,900.9 18.1 3.8
Source: C.A.P. Monitor. Data are for 1991.20 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
Austrian agricultural policy began to change even
before the discussion of enlargement.  Under a
Framework Agreement of 1990, the policy was being
oriented toward greater competition in processing and
marketing.  Set-asides had been introduced for cere-
als, where surpluses were evident, and farmers were
encouraged to switch to oilseeds.  The government
also instituted a supply restraint program for milk, and
paid compensation to farmers who left the sector.
Support payments were increased to mountain areas,
however, setting up the conflict with EU policy which
surfaced in the negotiations.
Austrian agriculture should not be too disadvantaged
by membership.  Climate and soil are productive in
valleys, and yields are high by the EU average.
Farms are smaller than the EU average (13.6 hectares,
versus 16.5), and livestock per farm is also low.  The
challenge of EC membership, therefore, includes
restructuring the domestic farming and processing
industries to compete with larger-scale firms in the
EU.
Finland
Finland shared with Austria the experience of living
under the shadow of Soviet foreign policy, though it
too retained democratic institutions and a market-
directed economy.  Its trade has been somewhat less
completely integrated with the EC, having strong ties
to both the former Soviet Union and to other Nordic
countries.  Finland’s dependency on Soviet trade
caused severe problems when the USSR broke apart.
Nevertheless, Finland is an affluent country with a
skilled work force and bountiful natural resources.  As
such it should also be able to assimilate with little dif-
ficulty into the EC market.
Table 8—Land use characteristics of the EFTA applicants for EU membership
Total Agricultural Arable Pasture Number 
Country land area land land land of farms
Mill. ha. Mill ha. Mill. ha. Mill. ha.
Austria 8.4 3.5 1.5 2.01 273,000
Finland 33.8 2.6 2.5 0.1 200,000
Norway 32.4 1.0 0.9 0.1 91,000
Sweden 44.9 3.4 2.9 0.5 95,000
Switzerland 4.1 2.0 0.3 1.71 94,000
EC-12 225.8 127.5 67.3 48.0 6,929,000
1Includes alpine pasture. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Western Europe Agriculture and Trade
Report, December 1992. Figures refer to 1990 or closest available year.
Table 9—Farm structure characteristics of the EFTA applicants for EU membership
Agric. area Cereal area Dairy cows  Cattle Pigs
Country per farm per farm per farm per farm per farm
Ha. Ha.
Austria 13.6 2.7 7.1 17.9 25.4
Finland 13.0 6.0 11.0 22.0 128.0
Norway 10.4 11.31 12.0 26.0 82.0
Sweden 29.0 14.0 22.0 36.01 158.0
Switzerland 15.21 4.9 12.5 28.1 69.0
EC-12 16.5 8.2 17.1 33.2 57.6
1Includes alpine pasture. 
Source: EC Commission. Statistics refer to various years between 1988 and 1990.Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 21
Finland has a population of 5 million and a per capita
income level of 23,000 ECU’s, well above the EU
average.  The agricultural sector employs about 7 per-
cent of the labor force, and generates 3 percent of
GDP.  However, only 7.6 percent of the land is used
for agriculture, and the population density, at 16
inhabitants per square km, is barely one-tenth that of
the EU average.  Farms are somewhat smaller than
the EU average (13 hectares, versus 16.5 for the EU-
12), and livestock herds are also smaller.
Finnish agriculture, in contrast to the manufacturing
sector, faces considerable problems arising from the
process of membership.  Protected for many years by
an autarchic policy that all but excluded imports,
Finnish farmers had to worry less about foreign com-
petition than about the slowly growing domestic
demand and the accumulation of troublesome surplus-
es.  Each year the government would negotiate with
farm groups the distribution of the cost of disposing
of such surpluses.
The opening of the domestic market to EC imports
will most likely be traumatic.  Agriculture began a
slow reorganization in preparation for the eventual
opening of the market, but yields are still low and
production costs high.  Price levels were frozen and
direct payments were given in compensation.  A sharp
devaluation of the Finnish Markka elevated import
prices and somewhat closed the gap between Finnish
and EU support levels.  Policies were implemented to
reduce the agricultural population and consolidate
farms.  However, Finland still anticipated a long tran-
sition in prices toward EU level.
Sweden
Sweden boasts an economy as technically advanced as
any in Western Europe, and a society that has prided
itself on external neutrality and domestic cohesion.
Nevertheless, in Sweden it was widely accepted that
closer links with the Union would be helpful in foster-
ing further economic progress.  In addition, neutrality
has been less of a guiding principle since the fall of
the Soviet Union, and even the much-praised domes-
tic social model was felt to need an overhaul.
Accession to the EU became a priority by 1991, and
Sweden was the first Scandinavian applicant to seek
membership.
The population of Sweden, at 8.5 million, makes it the
largest of the new members.  Per capita income levels
are comparable with Finland, and high by EU stan-
dards.  Swedish agriculture, which accounts for less
than 2 percent of the labor force and about 1.4 percent
of the GDP, is  comprised of small-scale farming in
the northern areas, akin to that found in Norway and
Finland, and efficient larger-scale farming on the
southern plains.  The latter areas rival Denmark for
productivity and have led to some export surpluses of
grain and livestock products from Sweden.  As a
result, Sweden can expect to be a supplier to other
markets in the region.
The changes in the agricultural sector expected as a
result of Swedish accession are likely to be less than
for the other Nordic countries.  Though Sweden his-
torically protected its agriculture at high levels, it
undertook a radical reform in 1991; its New Food
Policy brought price levels much more in line with
those of the EU.  The 35-percent reduction in cereal
prices over a 3-year period, compensated by hectarage
subsidies, was a preview of the policy adopted a year
later by the EU.  As a result of the reform, farmers in
Sweden have not taken such a negative stance on
accession as those in Finland or Norway.  On the
other hand, Sweden was careful to preserve, at least
for a time, the stricter health and phytosanitary stan-
dards that were adopted in that country.
Norway
The Norwegian population, at 4.2 million, is less than
that of the other applicants.  Income levels are high,
and the existence of considerable reserves of North
Sea oil and gas has given the economy a degree of
affluence and independence reflected in its relation-
ship with the Union.  Agriculture is a minor source of
employment (5.2 percent) and income (3 percent), but
plays a larger role in the economy of the northern part
of the country.  The fishing sector and the farming
industry have been concerned about the loss of
income that might follow the opening of the
Norwegian market to imports from the EU.  Farms are
generally small and produce at high cost.  The main22 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
areas of population are in the south of the country or
on the coast, more easily served by imports than by
remote domestic farms.  
Perhaps more so than its neighbors, Norwegian agri-
culture appears justified in fearing competition from
other parts of Europe.  Policy reform has been slow in
Norway, with concern about keeping the remote areas
populated, but some decrease in support prices has
been achieved, together with an increase in direct pay-
ments.  Dairy quotas have been cut and the govern-
ment has recompensed farmers for leaving milk pro-
duction.  However, with small, high-cost farms com-
prising most of the agricultural structure, the problem
of competitiveness may be difficult to solve.
Switzerland
Switzerland is the most affluent of the prospective EU
members, with a per capita income of 33,500 ECU,
nearly twice the EU average.  The population, at 6.7
million, is somewhat less than in Austria.  Agriculture
in Switzerland employs about 4 percent of the popula-
tion, and contributes just over 3 percent of GDP.  As
in Austria, agriculture plays a major role in the tourist
industry, both as a provider of food and services and
as guardian of the Alpine landscape.  Concern in rural
areas about the impact of EEA membership led to the
rejection of that treaty.  
The Swiss have also been taking the first steps toward
reform of their agricultural policies.  Changes intro-
duced in 1992 reduced the gap somewhat between
Swiss and EU agricultural policies and prices.  Direct
income payments compensated farmers for a reduc-
tion in the price supports and were linked to environ-
mental objectives in an attempt to encourage the flow
of positive benefits from agriculture to the landscape
and hence the tourist and recreation industries.
Agricultural Issues in the Negotiations
From this brief look at the agriculture and agricultural
policies of the applicant countries, the range of agri-
cultural issues in the negotiations can be seen to cen-
ter around four main topics of controversy:
•  The harmonization of price levels between the EU
and the (usually higher) prices in the applicant
countries, the most prominent issue;
•  The scope for special policies for farmers in geo-
graphically disadvantaged areas;
•  The competitiveness of the agricultural processing
and food sectors; and
•  The question of budget contributions, including the
decision as to who should pay any agreed upon
subsidies to northern and mountain farmers.  
These issues are addressed in turn, although they were
often interconnected in the negotiations.
Harmonization of Price Levels
The protection levels in the applicant countries in gen-
eral exceeded those of the EC.  The magnitude of this
disparity in protection levels is illustrated in table 10,
which shows the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE)
for the EFTA countries and the EU for the major com-
modities.  Higher support for grains, milk, and beef
exists in Finland and Norway, and for grain-fed live-
stock products (pigs, poultry, and eggs) in all the
EFTA countries, relative to the EU.19 Membership
entailed a significant downward price adjustment with
the important exception of Sweden, which had already
begun to reduce support.
The Community has been enlarged before, on three
separate occasions, giving some precedent for han-
dling the issue of support price differences in agricul-
ture.  In each of the three previous EU enlargements,
there were price gaps to overcome.
The UK, together with Denmark and Ireland, entered
the EC in 1973 with lower price levels for agricultural
goods.  As exporters of agricultural products,
Denmark and Ireland both wished for a speedy transi-
tion to full EC prices in order to take advantage of
access to the EC market.  The UK, by contrast,
19 Also evident is the generally high level of support for all com-
modities in Switzerland, an indication of the opposition in rural
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enjoyed low agricultural prices under a policy particu-
larly attractive to consumers.  Though British farmers
had the benefit of deficiency payments, the market
had been open to imports from the overseas
Commonwealth countries, as well as from Ireland and
Denmark, without tariffs or levies.  Though this poli-
cy was to change in 1973, EC membership still
implied a sharp rise in support prices together with the
adoption of a new support system.  
The transition was handled using “accession compen-
sation amounts” (aca’s), payments added to or sub-
tracted from levies and subsidies at the border to con-
trol the harmonization of price levels.  Over time
these aca’s were phased out until prices were finally
harmonized.  In addition, “special trade mechanisms”
(stm’s) in the form of quotas controlled against import
surges.  These mechanisms were used when Greece
joined the EC in 1981 and again for Spain in 1986.20
In the case of Portugal, an additional twist was added.
Portugal was given an additional “pre-transition” peri-
od during which the marketing system was to be
brought into line with that of the Community.
The defining nature of this “classic” transition method
is that border taxes and subsidies be used over an
extended period.  However, the EFTA countries were
acceding to a European Union which had already
completed the “Single Market” project, removing
internal trade barriers, and was committed by the
Maastricht Treaty to an “Economic and Monetary
Union.”  The Commission, negotiating on behalf of
the EU, took the view that joining a Post-Maastricht
Union precluded the use of border devices to maintain
price differences.  To keep border posts for the sole
purpose of collecting agricultural aca’s would be
administratively costly; any transition arrangements
should be of a budgetary nature.  
This policy was not in line with the wishes of three of
the applicants.  Austria argued for a 7-year transition
period for agricultural prices, and Finland wanted as
long as 12 years in which to harmonize price levels.
Only Sweden, with prices at or even below EU levels,
did not ask for a transition period.  In the end, the
Commission view prevailed, and no transition period
was allowed for prices.  But in consequence the appli-
cant countries were allowed to maintain more gener-
ous non-price subsidies than perhaps would have been
possible if there had been a transition period for price
harmonization.
The issue of price harmonization was not made easier
by 1992 CAP reform.  The cereal price level to which
the EFTA countries had to move was in effect low-
ered by 30 percent as a result of CAP reform.
Offsetting this, however, was the devaluation of sever-
al of the EFTA currencies, relative to the ECU, in the
1992-1994 period, which raised in domestic currency
the EU price support levels.
Table 10—Levels of farm support in EFTA applicants for EU membership: Producer subsidy
equivalent (PSE) levels in 1991
Commodity Austria Finland Sweden Norway Switzerland EC
Percent
Wheat 75 84 50 84 84 61
Coarse grains 35 84 57 86 83 55
Sugar, white 77 73 55 0 83 67
Milk 66 76 74 83 85 69
Beef and veal 55 60 51 71 83 54
Pigmeat 33 53 36 51 62 8
Poultry 47 58 35 50 85 18
Eggs 46 40 53 48 82 -3
Sheep 0 80 51 89 79 68
All commodities 52 72 59 77 80 49
Source: OECD PSE tables, 1993.
20 In the case of Spain, the concern was to prevent a sudden export surge
of agricultural goods from the new member to the existing Community.24 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
Special Programs for Farmers in Disadvantaged
Regions
The applicant countries were united by their agricul-
tural sectors’ need for additional support to compen-
sate for the locational disadvantages of altitude, slope,
short growing season, or remote location.  The EU has
for many years had a system of compensation for such
farmers under the “hill and less-favored area” (LFA)
Directive.  Payments are made, mainly to livestock
enterprises, on a headage basis.  Each of the appli-
cants, which had existing policies giving either higher
prices or extra payments to their remote and disadvan-
taged farm regions, calculated that the LFA Directive
would not adequately compensate for the loss of these
national programs.  
Three possible avenues were open:
•  Expand the definition of the LFA Directive so that
the Nordic and Alpine farms were all fully covered;  
•  Allow a continuation of the current national poli-
cies, at least for a limited period; or
•  Devise a new policy at the EU level which would
assist the farmers in the remote areas of the new
members.
In the end, all three options were extensively dis-
cussed.  The application of existing LFA payments to
the new members was ensured by modifying the defi-
nition of eligible farming situations.  Moreover,
Austria was allowed to choose criteria from among
those in use for existing members so as to increase the
country’s eligibility.  About 80 percent of the farming
area in Finland has been deemed eligible for LFA
grants, along with 50 percent of Swedish farmland
and 40 percent of Austrian farms.  This program is
funded from the budget of the EU (FEOGA), with
national co-payments.
National payments under existing programs were also
allowed to remain in use, though within some con-
straints.  The “Grundbetrag” payments for small farm-
ers in Austria were authorized for a period of 10 years
if adequate payments were not forthcoming from
other programs.  More significantly, state aids for
Nordic farmers can be paid “on a long-term basis” in
Finland and Sweden.  In addition to these national
programs, degressive compensation can be paid from
national funds over a 5-year period so long as the
compensation is not linked to current production.
The third option (a new EU policy for Nordic agricul-
ture) was ultimately rejected.  The Commission was
wary of special, higher price levels that would be
applied in specific parts of the Union, particularly as
these regions were less productive than others.  To
reward lower yields with higher prices and encourage
farming in the areas most remote from markets
seemed in contradiction to the EU’s desired special-
ization in an internal market.  Direct payments to
countries with higher-than-average incomes for
domestic political reasons did not appeal to the
Commission.  The compromise was to allow the new
members to continue regional payments, subject to
conditions on the means of payment, as described
above.
Non-price payments with respect to the adoption of
the existing CAP was an issue of importance to appli-
cant countries.  The cereal and oilseed farmers in
existing EC member states have benefited from com-
pensation payments, paid per hectare on the basis of
regional yields, following the price decreases of 1993-
1995.  From the negotiations’ beginning, all partici-
pating parties assumed that these payments would
form part of the “acquis,” and thus would be available
to new members.  This avoided the political problem
of appearing to treat EFTA farmers less generously
than those in existing member states, but also built in
the notion of an entitlement not tied to compensation
for a historical price drop.21
Processing Industry and Competitiveness
The lack of competitiveness of the agro-processing
industry and of the food sector as a whole was a con-
cern to all four applicants.  The Finnish food sector
grew up behind protective walls and was commonly
thought to be vulnerable to Danish and Swedish com-
petition. The Austrian agro-processing industry was
dominated by small-scale enterprises with guaranteed
21 Swedish farmers, for instance, would get the compensation payments
for a price drop which had already occurred in 1990 without compensa-
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margins and little competition within the country and
feared being swamped by German and Italian
processed goods.  Norway was concerned that north-
ern processing industries such as dairies and meat-
packing plants would be unable to survive without
direct government assistance.
The weakness of these sectors was generally recog-
nized; the cure was disputed.  The Commission
argued that the industries themselves would benefit
from lower prices for agricultural raw materials and
the structural changes that would come about in the
context of a wider market were just what was needed
for the survival of these sectors.  This view prevailed,
and no special provisions were made to continue sub-
sidies for the food sector in the applicant countries.
These industries would, however, be eligible for struc-
tural funds and would no doubt attract private capital
for their investment.
Budget Questions
As is normal in negotiations of this type, the conclu-
sion on the issue of contribution to the budget was left
until the last moment.  In effect, it acted as a balanc-
ing item, with payments to the prospective members
(or reduced collection of funds from them) used to
compensate for the “losses” in the negotiation
process.  In effect, the budget discussion allowed sev-
eral items to be rolled into one: The EU’s contribution
to the “national” payments for the compensation of
farmers for a rapid transition to EU price levels;
allowance for the time it would take for new members
to be able to use structural and other EU funds; and
the EU’s take-over of the payments made by the
EFTA countries in the name of “cohesion” as part of
the EEA agreement, as well as some other payments
for “flanking” policies.   
An additional budgetary item allowed for an expan-
sion of “agro-environmental” programs in the new
members.  In effect, the budget deal also allowed a
resolution to the underlying issue of who was to pay
for the MacSharry compensation payments to which it
was agreed the new members’ farmers were entitled.
Subject to the need in the applicant countries to keep
some equity in the budget balance with the EC, the
budget agreement solved each of  these financial
issues without having to argue each item individually. 
Terms of Accession for Agriculture
The final terms agreed to by the negotiators can be
summarized under eight headings:
1)  Immediate adoption of the policies and prices of
the CAP by all members:  The arguments of Austria,
Finland, and Norway to the contrary, EU price levels
were introduced into the new members with no transi-
tion period, meaning that no border taxes or subsidies
are required to keep market price levels different by
country.  The decision was forced by the logic of the
“single internal market,” which has no provision for
maintaining different price levels.  This puts the
accession of the EFTA countries in sharp contrast to
that of previous new members who were allowed tran-
sition periods, and sets a strong precedent for future
membership negotiations.
2) Allowance for digressive national aids for a 5-year
period to offset the price drops for farmers:
Transition periods for farmers were handled by pay-
ment of national subsidies on a digressive basis to
farmers.  The new members could pay state aids to
farmers where price gaps were significant, so long as
these aids decreased over the period.  The
Commission left it up to the new members to submit
for approval policies that would meet the relevant cri-
teria of digression and non-interference with trade.
3) Immediate participation in the budgetary mecha-
nisms, subject to a 4-year schedule of payments to the
new members:  The budget issue was sensitive, as the
new members were expected to be net contributors
and yet could not afford to be seen as such by their
voters.  In the end, the EU conceded that a budgetary
deal was needed to cushion the financial burden of
membership.  A schedule of payments to new mem-
bers amounting to 2.6 billion ECU (without Norway)
was delivered over a period of 4 years to offset the
cost of transitional national subsidies to disadvantaged
farmers.22 The magnitude of the final budget package
22 The first year’s contribution included a notional allowance because the
new members most likely would not receive funds from the various struc-
tural programs in that year, as a result of normal delays in preparing sub-
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for agriculture is shown in table 11, with a sharp
decline in EU contributions evident after 1996.  The
deal was clearly necessary to bring the negotiations to
an end, but equally clearly signifies the limited com-
mitment of the EU budget to the support of Nordic
farmers.23
4) A promise of “rapid action” by the Commission in
case of market disruption in the new members:
Though the Commission did not make clear what
action it would take (short of price interventions,
which are specifically excluded), this part of the
agreement has at least the effect of assuring farmers in
the new member countries that their situation will be
monitored in Brussels.
5) The authorization of long-term national aids to
Nordic farmers, subject to the conditions that they do
not distort competition and are not linked to “future”
production:  This element of the outcome is the main
response to the call for a special program to deal with
agriculture in the remote northern regions of the
enlarged Union. The specific regions in which such
payments would be authorized include those with low
population density (less than 10 people per square
km), low agricultural usage (less than 10 percent of
the total area in agriculture), and little arable land
(less than 20 percent of the agricultural land under
crops).  The area was designed to cover all land above
the 62nd parallel, as well as some areas below it.
Payments can be tied to hectares used, head of live-
stock, or past production levels.
The Nordic Agriculture Policy, which emerged from
the negotiations, was the product of compromise.  The
applicants in effect won the right to continue subsidies
to agriculture in the northern areas; in turn, the EU
was able to insist that these policies not distort com-
petition unduly in the Union.  The restriction that the
payments not be based on future production is an
attempt to reduce the output-increasing aspects of
income support.  Countries have yet to define the
policies that would qualify under this heading.
Whether the compromise language produces policies
acceptable to the EU remains to be seen.
6) Authorization of special national aids by Austria in
favor of small farmers for a 10-year period:  The
Austrian negotiators secured their goal to continue
paying a subsidy (the “Grundbetrag”) to small farm-
ers, at least for a 10-year period (if payments from
other aspects of the policy are not adequate to main-
tain incomes).  This issue was politically sensitive in
Austria, and its resolution was considered necessary
to make accession acceptable in rural areas.
7) Modification of the rules for Least Favored Area
payments to include more area of the adhering coun-
tries:  From the outset of the negotiations, the criteria
used in the existing EU for the definition of  “least
favored” areas were recognized as inadequate to give
new members the same benefits.  The compromise
involved modifying the criteria for payments to farm-
ers embedded in current legislation.  In effect, new
members were allowed to pick and choose the criteria
from the range employed in present member states.
Austria, for example, chose a mixture of the French
criteria for altitude and slope of land and the German
criteria for location and population density.  Forty per-
Table 11—Budgetary compensation to new members for agricultural programs
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Million ECU
Austria 583 106 71 35 795
Finland 476 163 65 33 737
Sweden 488 432 76 31 1,027
Total 1,547 1 701 212 99 2,559
1Includes 861 million ECU’s to compensate for loss of eligibility for structural funds. 
Source: Chapter 15 (Agriculture) in General Secretariat of the European Council (1994).
23 The final budget package also included some adjustments arising from
the new members’ “cohesion” contributions to EEA financing and to the
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cent of Austrian farmers will qualify for LFA pay-
ments under these criteria.  For Sweden, the propor-
tion is higher (50-percent eligibility), while in Finland
85 percent of the farmland is covered by the LFA cri-
teria.
8) Allowing new members to rapidly implement
“agro-environmental programs in favor of [their]
farmers”:  The new members share with each other a
commitment to the environment and a need to demon-
strate that commitment in a way visible to the public.
This is reinforced in the terms of accession by the
commitment of budgetary funds for the implementa-
tion of agro-environmental programs.  The sums indi-
cated in the agreement include 175 million ECU’s for
Austria, 135 million ECU’s for Finland, and 165 mil-
lion ECU’s for Sweden.
Impact of Membership
New members’ concern about massive disruption of
the rural economy as a result of membership was
understandable and realistic, given the protected
nature of agricultural markets in these countries.  The
concern was not shared in Brussels, where the notion
of accession by countries that would buy more EU
farm products rather than add to surpluses was
encouraged.
In fact, the quantitative impact on European agricul-
tural markets of the accession to the EU of the three
new members is unlikely to be great.  This is due to
three factors: 
•  The countries themselves are relatively small, both
in terms of population and agricultural production,
and will not add greatly to the volume of produc-
tion in the Union.  
•  The three new members have negotiated the free-
dom to pay substantial hectarage and headage pay-
ments to farmers in remote areas, which will pre-
sumably act to keep those farmers from leaving the
land idle.  Production will no doubt fall over time,
with depopulation and extensification, but a major
migration is not expected in the short run.  
•  Production in some areas could actually increase as
a result of the opening of markets. Swedish sales to
Finland, for instance, could increase.  Not all sec-
tors in closed markets are necessarily inefficient.
Even Finland could find that some parts of the agri-
cultural sector might develop export markets in
addition to competing well with imports from the
EU.  
The ESIM model was used to see whether this expec-
tation of little change in the overall EU balance was
supported by empirical estimation.
Model Results
The quantitative results of the ESIM model, using the
same scenarios discussed above, for the EFTA coun-
tries show this lack of dramatic change in the market
balance as a result of EU membership.  The produc-
tion, demand, and net trade of grains (wheat plus
coarse grains) for the EFTA countries are shown in
table 12 for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. 
Grains
The results indicate a slower rate of growth of grain
production in the new members due to membership.
The level of grain output is expected to be 3.1 million
tons less by the year 2000 than if these countries had
not joined.  By the year 2005, this gap could rise to
3.6 million tons.  The reduction in prices as a result of
the CAP constrains the growth in grain production,
but the effect is not felt in the short run.  Indeed, in
1995, production was actually higher with member-
ship, the result of an increase in support for grain pro-
ducers in Sweden, where the combination of higher
support prices and generous compensation payments
under the CAP led to an expansion of grain output.
Grain output for the EFTA-3 is the same for scenarios
1, 2, and 3 because the entry of the EFTA-2 and the
CEEC-4 in 2000 does not markedly influence these
countries.  There is, however, some slight decline in
grain output (400,000 tons) in scenario 4, when the
CAP is further reformed.24
The EFTA-2 are assumed in scenario 2 to join the EU
at the turn of the century, which is estimated to drop
their grain production by 0.7 million tons in that year
24 The assumption of further CAP reform influences other com-
modities more than cereals, where the 1992 reform program is
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and by 0.8 million tons by the year 2005.  These
countries are only marginally affected by further CAP
reform. 
Domestic demand for grain increases in the EFTA-3
with membership, as a result of lower market prices,
with the exception of a temporary drop in consump-
tion in 1995 as a result of higher Swedish prices that
year.  By the year 2000, these three countries consume
1.7 million tons more cereal, a figure which drops to
1.2 million tons of additional cereal use by 2005.  The
net result of the production and consumption shifts is
a net export decrease by the year 2000 of 4.4 million
tons from the EFTA-3;  the corresponding figure in
2005 is 6.1 million tons, a 5-million ton drop from the
projected base case scenario of no membership.  
Accession of the EFTA countries appears to relieve to
a certain extent the pressure on the cereals market in
Western Europe as a whole (EFTA plus EU), though
adding to the surplus of the EU.  The EFTA-2, if they
were to join in the year 2000, would switch from
minor exporters of 200,000 tons to importers of about
800,000 tons.
Other Crops and Livestock
The projections of market balance for other crops and
for livestock products show that rather little impact
can be expected from membership. Sugar production
is likely to fall somewhat from the 1993 levels, as
negotiated production quotas were based on the previ-
ous 5-year average production.  The level of sugar
quotas on which support prices will be paid is given
in table 13.  Sugar produced over and above these
quotas (often referred to as “C” sugar) can be sold on
the world market without subsidy.  Sugar consump-
tion will tend to increase as price levels come down.
As a result, the EFTA-3 is likely to be roughly self-
sufficient in sugar in the years to come.
Oilseed production is modest in the EFTA countries,
but appears likely to increase markedly with member-
ship, taking up some of the land released from grain
Table 12—Grain market, EFTA countries
EFTA-33 1989/91 1995 2000 2005 EFTA-22 1989/91 1995 2000 2005
Total grain production Million metric tons Million metric tons
Base 14.7 12.5 18.9 21.2 Base 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.7
Scenario 1 14.7 14.1 15.8 17.6 Scenario 1 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.7
Scenario 2 14.7 14.1 15.8 17.6 Scenario 2 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.9
Scenario 3 14.7 14.1 15.8 17.6 Scenario 3 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.9
Scenario 4 14.7 14.1 15.4 17.2 Scenario 4 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.8
Domestic demand
Base 11.3 9.6 10.1 10.2 Base 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.2
Scenario 1 11.3 8.9 11.8 11.4 Scenario 1 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.2
Scenario 2 11.3 8.9 12.5 12.2 Scenario 2 3.2 2.8 3.4 3.4
Scenario 3 11.3 8.9 12.4 12.1 Scenario 3 3.2 2.8 3.4 3.4
Scenario 4 11.3 8.9 12.3 11.9 Scenario 4 3.2 2.8 3.4 3.4
Net trade
Base 3.4 2.8 8.8 11.1 Base -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.5
Scenario 1 3.4 5.2 4.0 6.1 Scenario 1 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.5
Scenario 2 3.4 5.2 3.3 5.3 Scenario 2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6
Scenario 3 3.4 5.2 3.4 5.5 Scenario 3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5
Scenario 4 3.4 5.2 3.1 5.3 Scenario 4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6
1The EFTA-3 includes Austria, Sweden, and Finland.
2The EFTA-2 are Norway and Switzerland.
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production.  The EFTA-3 could double their produc-
tion, from 300,000 to 600,000 tons, with accession.
This same increase is projected to be maintained
through 2005.  The quantities produced are still likely
to remain small in relation to the EU market as a
whole.
Livestock is made more complex by the extensive
headage payments to farmers under both pre-existing
national policies in the new members and under CAP
regulations.  The new members negotiated quotas for
milk (table 13) which would allow them to continue
with current levels of production.  The ESIM projec-
tions show the level of milk production constant at the
quota level for the next few years, as milk production
remains a profitable activity under high support
prices.  The CAP, as reformed in 1992, allows
headage payments for cattle and sheep subject to
overall limits.  
These limits, shown for the new members in table 14,
represent historical levels of the herd.  The production
of beef is, therefore, unlikely to fall, and is projected
to rise after membership partly as a result of lower
feed costs.  Grain-using livestock, particularly pork
and poultry, will be affected both by lower feed costs
and by increasing competition from the rest of the
EU.  Pork output is projected to fall marginally after
membership but recover by the end of the decade.
Poultry production is unlikely to shift greatly as a
result of accession.
The impact of EFTA accession on EU budget costs is
likely to be rather modest.  Budget costs for the EU as
a whole rise when accession increases the amount of
surpluses that must be exported, or when extra output
reduces tariff and levy revenue.  Neither impact is
likely in the context of the EFTA-3 accession.  The
sharp decline of market prices in the new members
and their replacement by a set of more-or-less decou-
pled policies will avoid any increased surpluses.  The
cost will, however, increase with the burden on EU
funds of the MacSharry compensation payments to
farmers in the new member states, as well as the bud-
get deal to pay for transition policies.  These pay-
ments add up to a small increase in expenditure on
agricultural support, offset by the new members’ con-
tributions to the financial resources of the EU.
The impact of the accession of the three new members
on agricultural markets is therefore likely to be mod-
est.  The significance of this accession lies more in
the precedents that the accession may have set for the
much more significant enlargement of the Union to
the east.  The instant adoption of CAP rules and
prices, together with flexible use of structural pro-
grams and the encouragement of nationally financed
compensation payments, gives a new model for the
process of accession.
Table 13—Milk and sugar quotas for new members
Milk Sugar
Country Deliveries Direct sales Reserve A quota B quota
1,000 tons
Austria 2,205 367 180 316.5 73.9
Finland1 2,342 10 200 133.4 13.3
Sweden 3,300 3 175 336.4 33.6
1Finland also received a quota for isoglucose (HFCS) of 11,930 tons and a temporary raw sugar input quota of
40,000 tons.
Source: Chapter 15 (Agriculture) in General Secretariat of the European Council (1994).
Table 14—Beef and sheep reference quantities
Country Suckler cows Male cattle Ewes
Austria 325,000 423,400 205,651
Finland 55,000 250,000 80,000
Sweden 155,000 250,000 180,000
Source: Chapter 15 (Agriculture) in General
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Accession Impacts: 
Central and Eastern Europe
While EFTA-3 accession already occurred and its
direct agricultural implications are likely to be minor,
accession of countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (CEEC’s) is in the future, but its implications
for EU agricultural markets and policies may be very
significant. Indeed, agriculture is rightly considered to
be one of the “political land mines” on the way
toward eastern enlargement of the EU.
Policy Issues
There is no doubt that the EU has the political will to
include the CEEC’s, and to do so as soon as possible.
At the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, the EU
heads of state and government agreed “that the associ-
ated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so
desire shall become members of the European Union”
as soon as they are able “to assume the obligations of
membership by satisfying the economic and political
conditions required.”  This intention was strongly
reconfirmed by the December 1994 Essen Summit
and gained power from the presence of the heads of
government of the associated CEEC’s at that Summit
and later Summits.  Eastern enlargement is one of the
most important political projects of the EU for the
years to come, and discussions on how to proceed will
intensify greatly in the near future.
Currently the timing of CEEC accession and the
sequence of individual CEEC’s to become new mem-
bers of the EU are unknown.  Many in the EU believe
that the Union will have to rearrange its own institu-
tional structure before it can seriously begin to negoti-
ate on Eastern enlargement.  The Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC), which convened in 1996, was to
deal with related issues, such as voting procedures in
the Council of Ministers, the size of the Commission,
and the composition of the European Parliament in
order to adjust EU institutions to the larger Union
resulting from EFTA enlargement and future rounds
of enlargement.  Unfortunately, the IGC concluded in
June 1997 without solving any of these issues, leaving
them to yet another IGC.  
At the conclusion of the IGC, the European
Commission announced that accession negotiations
with some of the CEEC’s should be initiated in 1998.
Of the CEEC’s included in this report (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), only Slovakia
was not invited to start discussions next year.  This
announcement came well after the conclusion of this
report; further analysis, excluding Slovakia, has not
been undertaken.25 Furthermore, Slovakia is a rela-
tively small country whose exclusion from the analy-
sis would not materially affect the results.  But
Slovakia, the remaining Balkan countries (Romania
and Bulgaria), and the two Baltic states (Latvia and
Lithuania) were assured that they too could start nego-
tiations after further reforms.  Within a few years the
EU is likely, therefore, to be engaged in accession
negotiations with all the CEEC’s with whom it now
has association agreements.  Actual membership of
any CEEC is unlikely to be achieved much before the
year 2000, but it is probable that around the turn of
the century or shortly thereafter the first round of
Eastern enlargement may take place.   
At the time of this analysis it was not clear which
group of CEEC’s would be included in the first
enlargement wave.  The four Visegrad countries were
selected for this analysis for a variety of reasons.  The
Czech Republic and Hungary may be at the top of the
list as far as economic criteria are concerned.
However, for political reasons having to do with geo-
strategic considerations, Poland is unlikely to be left
out of the first wave of CEEC accession.  When the
scenarios were constructed, political considerations
were expected to lead to Slovakia’s inclusion  in the
first group.  Hence, the whole of the Visegrad-4 group
were assumed to be in the same boat in terms of
Eastern enlargement, so the current study modeled the
addition of all four Visegrad countries in the EU with
the year 2000 a possible date for entry in the simula-
tion runs dealing with CEEC’s accession (scenarios 3
and 4).
Agriculture: The Political “Land Mine” 
Agriculture is a “political land mine” on the way to
Eastern enlargement of the EU for a number of rea-
25 The other countries invited to negotiate accession in 1998,
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sons.  Eastern enlargement could create difficulties for
the viability of the CAP because agriculture in the
CEEC’s is simply much more important, in terms of
its contribution to both employment and GDP, than in
the EU on average, even in the poorer member states
of the current Union, except Greece (table 15).
With the CEEC’s accession, the EU would become
much more agricultural than it currently is.  If all 10
CEEC’s currently in association agreements with the
EU had acceded to the Union in 1993, the GDP of the
EU-15 would have grown by only 3.2 percent, but the
size of EU agriculture would have increased by
approximately one-third (table 16).  The Visegrad-4
countries account for a large share of total CEEC agri-
cultural production, and agricultural output for these
four candidates is large relative to that of the EU-12
(fig. 1). 
The period 1989-91 is not a good starting point for
assessing the importance of CEEC accession to agri-
culture.  Major changes have taken place in the
CEEC’s since that period as a result of the transforma-
tion processes in these countries.  In the base period
for ESIM data (the average of 1989 to 1991), the
Visegrad-4 countries jointly produced as much as one-
third of EU-12 total grain production, approximately
one-quarter of EU-12 milk and pork output, more than
one-fourth of EU-12 production of sugar and oilseeds,
and approximately one-sixth of beef and poultry out-
put of the EU-12.  
As a result, the agricultural potential of the CEEC-4
may seem smaller, and therefore less threatening, for
the CAP than may have been the case in the late
1980’s.  On the other hand, food demand and overall
use of agricultural products in the CEEC-4 fell signifi-
cantly since transformation began, and net trade in
agriculture changed less than the decline in output
might suggest. With these fundamental changes result-
ing from the transition process in the CEEC-4, the
future of their agricultural markets, and therefore the
agricultural implications of their accession to the EU,
are not immediately obvious.
Table 15—Share of agriculture in total GDP















Source: European Commission (1995a and c).
Table 16—Size of agriculture in the 10
CEEC’s relative to the EU-15, 1993
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Modeling Issues
The fundamental changes that occurred in the CEEC-
4 in recent years pose a significant problem for the
scenario analysis to be pursued with ESIM.  To put it
in abstract terms, in an analytical framework like
ESIM and with the policy scenarios considered here, a
major part of the action takes place in the form of
movements on given supply and demand curves
resulting from price changes implied by policy shifts
such as accession to the EU. The results of such an
analysis may be relatively robust where the conditions
determining supply and demand, except for price
changes, are reasonably stable. 
In the CEEC-4, on the other hand, both supply and
demand curves for agricultural products have shifted
significantly in the recent past and may continue to
shift for some time due to economic and political
restructuring.  Against that background, using the gen-
eral base period for ESIM, 1989-91, as the starting
point for scenario analysis seemed inappropriate.
Instead, data for the most recent year for which statis-
tics were available (at the time of the analysis), 1993,
were used to re-calibrate models for the CEEC-4
countries, so for all years after 1993 the CEEC-4
models are effectively run off a 1993 base.
However, assumptions made about the future location
of supply and demand curves relative to that starting
point preclude a fair amount of speculation into these
assumptions.  One way of injecting speculation is to
look at the nature of changes between 1989, when
transition began, and 1993 to judge whether supply
and demand conditions may, at least partially, have
returned to where they were before the transformation
process, or whether the changes which have taken
place in recent years should be extrapolated into the
future.
On the demand side, several factors contributed to the
decline in food consumption in the CEEC’s since tran-
sition began, but the most important elements in the
equation can probably be identified with reasonable
certainty.  One decisive factor was the elimination of
the large subsidies that governments in centrally
planned economies introduced into the agricultural
and retail food systems in order to keep food prices
low in spite of high production costs resulting from
inefficient production structures in both agriculture
and the food industry. This change is likely to be per-
manent.
Another factor behind the decline in consumption of
traditional foods during the transition process proba-
bly was the appearance of consumer goods not earlier
available on the market.  This factor will also be per-
manent.  A transitory factor, on the other hand, will be
the decline in real consumer incomes that has taken
place during the transformation process, and the sig-
nificant increase in unemployment and the resulting
uncertainties. The income factor is easy to take into
account in the scenario analysis through appropriate
assumptions on future growth of consumer incomes. 
Most of the other factors behind the decline in food
consumption are likely to be non-transitory, so the
model assumed that consumption levels reached in
1993 can be used as a starting point for the scenario
analysis.  Future demand is derived from these levels
based on expected changes in prices, real incomes,
and population, but no additional shifters are assumed
for human demand in the CEEC’s.
On the supply side, the factors that resulted in the
notable output decline were more complex than on the
demand side.  Real producer prices in agriculture have
fallen significantly. In part, this price decline reflected
decreasing demand, both domestically and for exports
to other countries in the orbit of the FSU.  Elimination
of consumer subsidies was another factor behind the
price declines.  Difficulties in the food industry, which
spilled over into the market for raw agricultural prod-
ucts, added to the decline of real farm product prices.
Whatever the reasons, the strong real price decline
during transition is not in itself a problem for an
analysis using a model like ESIM, because the decline
did not result in a shift of supply curves (except for
cross-commodity price effects, which are fully taken
into account in ESIM), but rather a movement on
existing supply schedules.
Other factors added to the decline in the CEEC’s agri-
cultural production, most notably the many and far-
reaching difficulties involved in the fundamentalEconomic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 33
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restructuring of agriculture which went along with pri-
vatization and de-collectivization.  Traumatic as these
changes were, many of the implications for agricultur-
al output are likely to be transitory.  Once the difficult
and painful process of privatization and restructuring
is complete, CEEC agriculture is likely to emerge
with better productivity than before transition began.
What this means for the future location of supply
curves in CEEC agriculture is less clear.  Reduced
factor input, particularly labor, may well compensate
for much, if not all, of the expected productivity
gains.  
It is probably safe to assume that supply curves in
CEEC agriculture will tend to shift to the right from
where they were in 1993.  Agriculture is not the only
sector where output has fallen dramatically during the
transition process in the CEEC’s.  In fact, agriculture
has proven more robust in the transformation process
than other sectors.  Relative to industrial output, agri-
cultural production has actually increased in most
CEEC’s.  This relative health of CEEC agriculture
during the transition process may justify some cau-
tious optimism regarding the ability of the farming
industry in the Visegrad-4 countries to recover from
some of the output decline suffered during the first
few years of transition.
In the ESIM components for the Visegrad-4 countries,
shifters have therefore been used to move supply
curves gradually to the right from their 1993 loca-
tions.  Though these shifters are essentially arbitrary
and reflect the authors’ views on what might happen
in CEEC-4 agriculture in the years to come, they are
basically set so that most of the decline in output
between the base period (1989-91) and 1993 is recov-
ered by the year 2000.  For feed demand of the indi-
vidual livestock categories, the assumption was made
that feeding efficiency will increase, from 1994
onward, by an annual rate of 0.5 percent.
An important issue in modeling market and trade poli-
cies for the Visegrad-4 countries was to define their
starting point appropriately.  Base period 1993 price
levels for the commodities included in ESIM needed
to be determined in a way consistent with price defini-
tions used for the EU, where CAP price policies oper-
ate at the level of wholesale prices.  For example,
intervention prices are prices to wholesalers, rather
than farm gate prices.  Hence, in order to measure
price gaps between the Visegrad-4 countries and the
EU, the appropriate wholesale level prices for the
Visegrad-4 countries were needed. 
Unfortunately, agricultural price information for the
Visegrad-4 countries is generally still somewhat of a
problem, and wholesale prices are not usually avail-
able.  Therefore, farm gate prices from national statis-
tics were used as a starting point and assumed market-
ing margins between farm gate and wholesale level
were added.  The margins assumed were generally
those used by OECD in their PSE calculations for
Hungary (OECD, 1994b) and Poland (OECD, 1995).
The resulting price gaps in 1993 between the
Visegrad-4 countries and the EU (calculated at 1993
actual exchange rates) are shown for major products
in figure 3, where 1993 EU prices are set equal to
100. Agricultural prices have differed significantly
among the Visegrad-4 countries but generally have
been considerably below prices in the EU.  In many
cases, a Visegrad-4 country’s prices in 1993 were
close to world market prices.  As a result of the
MacSharry reforms and due to future assumed infla-
tion in the EU, CAP prices in real terms will fall by
the year 2000, closing the price gap between the
Visegrad-4 countries and the EU.  Consequently, the
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price gap would be smaller in 2000 than it was in
1993. 
The future price gap between the EU and the
Visegrad-4 countries will also depend on real
exchange rate developments.  If real exchange rates in
the Visegrad-4 countries were to depreciate vis-à-vis
the ECU, then the price gap would widen, and vice
versa.  Whether the Visegrad-4 currencies are now
overvalued or undervalued is not clear, but both
hypotheses are well argued.  In the model runs (and in
the prices for 2000 in figure 3), real exchange rates
are assumed constant.
Visegrad-4 agricultural policies have become increas-
ingly similar to the CAP, although in practice they are
not implemented in the same way as those under the
CAP.  For most core products there is a more or less
rigid price guarantee often protected by import mea-
sures and export subsidies. 
In modeling the Visegrad-4 country policies, for a
number of products the same price policy instruments
as are used under the CAP are assumed to apply.  For
products such as cereals, sugar, dairy products (butter
and SMP), and beef, Visegrad-4 countries are mod-
eled to implement price band policies equivalent to
those resulting from intervention and threshold prices
in the CAP.  The locations of these price bands for the
Visegrad-4 countries are determined to fit actual
prices and net trade positions observed in 1993.  From
that starting position, price bands are then assumed to
move in accordance with the assumptions made in the
respective scenarios for individual runs (i.e., kept con-
stant in real terms, or approaching CAP levels under
accession scenarios).
Scenario Results
In the base scenario, as well as in scenarios 1 and 2,
the CEEC-4 are assumed to remain outside the EU.
Moreover, their national policies are assumed to be
pursued without regard to a future possible accession
to the EU.  For most products, the CEEC-4 are
assumed to shape their domestic market and trade
policies such that their domestic market prices are
kept constant, in real terms, at their 1993 levels.  This
is particularly true for cereals, milk, and beef, where
the CEEC-4 have generally established market
regimes that provide for some form of more or less
stringent price guarantee to domestic producers.  For
oilseeds and cereal substitutes, the CEEC-4 are
assumed to maintain the tariff policies that were in
place in 1993. 
For pork, poultry, and eggs, the assumption for the
base scenario is that domestic and trade policies aim
at a given net trade volume that existed in 1993.
Domestic market prices are determined endogenously
such that this net trade volume is maintained.  No pro-
duction quotas are assumed, and set-aside as well as
compensation payments are assumed to be non-exis-
tent, as was the case in 1993.
In scenarios 3 and 4, the Visegrad-4 are assumed to
join the EU in the year 2000 and to adopt the CAP as
defined under those scenarios at that time.  Moreover,
under these scenarios, the CEEC-4 are assumed to
begin aligning their policies with the CAP in the year
1996, after having pursued their domestic policies
until 1995 as defined in the base scenario.  In other
words, under scenarios 3 and 4, the CEEC-4 are treat-
ed as if they know what price levels and other policies
the EU is going to have in the year 2000 (namely, the
policies defined for the EU in the respective scenario
for the CAP). 
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The CEEC-4 are assumed to embark, beginning in
1996, on a smooth price-policy trajectory such that
the gap between prices and policies that still existed in
1995 is reduced by one-fifth in each subsequent year.
Full policy alignment with the CAP is thus achieved
in the year 2000.  In scenarios 3 and 4, accession to
the EU and full implementation of the CAP in 2000 is
also assumed to mean that set-aside and compensation
payments as introduced into the CAP under the
MacSharry reforms are extended to the CEEC-4. 
Milk and sugar quotas are assumed not implemented
in the CEEC-4 even after their accession to the EU in
order to get a better feel for supply pressure in the
CEEC-4.  For pork, poultry, and eggs, the assumption,
in line with the base scenario and scenarios 1 and 2, is
that there is one aggregate net trade target for the
enlarged EU.  This aggregate net trade is the sum of
the net trade targets which all members of the EU had
prior to CEEC accession.
Scenarios 1 and 2 will not be presented here, as they
pursue the same policies with the same results as
under the base scenario.  Instead, scenario 3a is pre-
sented where no set aside is required and hence no
compensation payments are made in the CEEC-4.
This scenario is introduced as a possible solution to
the budget problems pointed out above.  
Results for the CEEC-4 are significantly affected by
their accession to the EU, though not always in the
way expected.  Grain production is a particularly
interesting case (figure 4 and table 17).  Under the
base scenario, total grain production in 1995 is some
15 percent less than in the base period (1989-91 aver-
age) because of the decline in production during the
transition period. 
By 2000, total Visegrad-4 grain production in the base
scenario recovers to approximately the volume during
the base period, around 55 million tons, reflecting the
assumptions made regarding supply shifters in the
CEEC-4. By the year 2005, yield growth adds another
5.6 million tons to CEEC-4 grain production.  This
pattern of output changes under the base scenario is
apparent for all products.  However, accession to the
EU and implementation of the CAP, as assumed under
scenario 3, results in less CEEC-4 grain production in
2000 and 2005 than under the base scenario.  This
may appear surprising, given that accession to the EU
triggers a price rise in the CEEC-4 (for wheat, figure
5 and table 18).  The reason for this somewhat unex-
pected result is the assumption that full implementa-
tion of the CAP in the CEEC-4 includes set-aside and
compensation payments; higher prices on EU acces-
sion stimulate production less than it is reduced by
implementation of set-asides.  The effect of set-aside
and compensation payments on CEEC grain produc-
tion is demonstrated by scenario 3a, where all factors
are identical to those in scenario 3 except that set
aside and compensation payments are assumed not
applied to the CEEC-4.
As can be seen in figure 4, under scenario 3a, total
CEEC-4 grain production responds positively to the
price rise resulting from accession to the EU in the
year 2000, and is significantly higher than under sce-
nario 3 where set-aside and compensation payments
are assumed to have been applied to the CEEC-4.
One of the most interesting questions is how set-aside
and compensation payments extended to the CEEC-4
affect the EU budget, which will be discussed again
below.
Production of oilseeds in the CEEC-4 responds slight-
ly positively to EU accession (table 17), but this is not
due to price changes.  Indeed, oilseed prices in the
CEEC-4 drop somewhat on EU accession (see rape-
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seed prices in table 18) as EU zero tariffs on oilseeds
are then applied to the CEEC-4 as well.  The slightly
positive supply response for oilseeds on EU accession
is mainly due to compensation payments assumed to
be extended to CEEC-4 oilseed production under sce-
nario 3.
CEEC-4 production of sugar and milk, assumed not
constrained by quotas under scenario 3, increases
strongly upon accession to the EU because of the sig-
nificant price rise resulting from inclusion in the CAP
(tables 17 and 18).  With lower CAP support prices
assumed under scenario 4, CEEC-4 production of
both sugar and milk is somewhat less than under an
unreformed CAP as implied in scenario 3.  However,
even under scenario 4, CEEC-4 prices for these prod-
ucts are still higher than in the absence of EU acces-
sion (base scenario), so CEEC-4 production in sce-
nario 4 is higher than in the absence of EU accession.
The Quota Dilemma: Sugar and Dairy Impacts for
the CAP
Enlargement to the east has important implications for
future EU policies in the sectors of sugar and milk.
The EU has two options: (1) Reform the CAP for
sugar and milk with quotas abolished and support
prices reduced, or (2) extend the quota regimes for
sugar and milk to the CEEC-4.  Quota extension to
the CEEC-4 is required because, with these countries’
potential, production would otherwise rapidly expand
in response to high CAP support prices.
Nonimposition of quotas would also be politically dif-
ficult to accept by farmers in the “old” member states
of the EU whose production is constrained by quotas
in the EU-15 while sugar and milk output in the
CEEC-4 remains unconstrained.
Table 17—Production and use of major agricultural products under alternative scenarios
Production Total use
Product 1989/91 1995 2000 2005 1989/91 1995 2000 2005
Million tons Million tons
Total grain
Base 53.75 45.38 54.85 60.45 51.90 41.17 43.07 45.43
Scenario 3 53.75 45.40 51.71 56.89 51.90 41.85 45.93 49.22
Scenario 4 53.75 45.40 50.38 55.70 51.90 41.85 47.35 50.81
Wheat
Base 21.56 18.19 22.76 25.05 20.11 16.55 17.81 18.84
Scenario 3 21.56 18.22 21.13 23.36 20.11 16.65 19.14 20.17
Scenario 4 21.56 18.22 20.42 22.39 20.11 16.65 20.07 21.47
Coarse grain
Base 32.19 27.18 32.09 35.40 31.80 24.63 25.26 26.58
Scenario 3 32.19 27.19 30.59 33.53 31.80 25.19 26.79 29.05
Scenario 4 32.19 27.19 29.95 33.31 31.80 25.19 27.28 29.34
Barley
Base 9.35 8.05 9.15 10.03 9.36 8.05 8.86 9.42
Scenario 3 9.35 8.06 8.97 9.97 9.36 8.14 8.31 8.88
Scenario 4 9.35 8.06 8.56 9.62 9.36 8.14 8.87 9.48
Sugar
Base 3.33 2.99 3.21 3.51 3.02 3.07 3.38 3.64
Scenario 3 3.33 2.99 4.71 5.04 3.02 3.07 2.98 3.24
Scenario 4 3.33 2.99 4.19 4.49 3.02 3.07 3.14 3.42
Oilseeds
Base 2.63 2.33 2.79 3.03 2.63 2.33 2.79 3.03
Scenario 3 2.63 2.31 2.89 2.84 2.63 2.31 2.89 2.84
Scenario 4 2.63 2.31 3.05 2.85 2.63 2.31 3.05 2.85
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If quotas were maintained with eastern enlargement,
then the difficult issue remains: which base to use for
allocating quotas to CEEC-4 producers. If results gen-
erated by ESIM tell a realistic story, then a quota allo-
cation to the CEEC-4 based on their sugar and milk
output in the mid-1990’s would constrain them far
below their actual production potential under support
prices which EU farmers have enjoyed for a long
time.   
On the other hand, quota allocation on the basis of
CEEC output immediately before their accession
would amount to an invitation to the CEEC’s to make
the fullest possible use of their production potential
during the pre-accession period.  In this case, the
resulting surplus production in the CEEC-4 prior to
accession would require them to bear heavy budgetary
costs, essentially in order to create property rights to
Table 17—Production and use of major agricultural products under alternative scenarios (cont.)
Production Total use
Product 1989/91 1995 2000 2005 1989/91 1995 2000 2005
Million tons Million tons
Rapeseed
Base 1.77 1.47 1.89 2.03 1.18 1.17 1.17 1.17
Scenario 3 1.77 1.45 1.90 2.06 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.16
Scenario 4 1.77 1.45 2.03 2.16 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.16
Milk
Base 25.33 21.26 23.69 26.26 25.33 21.26 23.69 26.26
Scenario 3 25.33 21.26 29.92 32.56 25.33 21.26 29.92 32.56
Scenario 4 25.33 21.26 28.05 30.48 25.33 21.26 28.05 30.48
Butter
Base 0.47 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.34 0.37 0.39
Scenario 3 0.47 0.35 0.61 0.66 0.47 0.34 0.27 0.29
Scenario 4 0.47 0.35 0.51 0.55 0.47 0.34 0.28 0.30
Beef
Base 1.32 1.15 1.20 1.32 1.25 1.20 1.29 1.40
Scenario 3 1.32 1.14 1.60 1.75 1.25 1.20 0.93 1.02
Scenario 4 1.32 1.14 1.51 1.65 1.25 1.20 1.00 1.09
Pork
Base 3.85 3.23 3.29 3.61 3.61 3.23 3.46 3.75
Scenario 3 3.85 3.33 4.32 4.80 3.61 3.20 3.21 3.50
Scenario 4 3.85 3.33 4.32 4.79 3.61 3.20 3.27 3.56
Poultry
Base 0.97 0.79 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.83 0.94 1.05
Scenario 3 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.77 0.81 0.89 0.99
Scenario 4 0.97 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.77 0.81 0.89 1.00
Source: European Simulation Model
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Figure 5
Wheat prices in the CEEC-4 under alternative
scenarios, weighted average
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expected quota benefits under the CAP after joining
the EU.
Net Effects on Grains and Livestock
CEEC-4 production of beef, pork, and poultry
expands strongly with EU accession, reflecting higher
EU prices (tables 17 and 18). With reduced CAP sup-
port prices (scenario 4), beef production in the CEEC-
4 after accession is still significantly higher than in
the base scenario. Pork production in the CEEC-4
does not change when CAP prices are reduced (com-
pare scenarios 3 and 4) because pork prices, which are
not subject to domestic price support in the EU, fall
parallel with prices of cereals and other feeds, leaving
the profitability of pork production unchanged. For
poultry, the feed-price reduction (under scenario 4) is
Table 18—CEEC-4 aggregate net exports and market prices of major agricultural products under
alternative scenarios
Net exports Market price
Product 1989/91 1995 2000 2005 1989/91 1995 2000 2005
Million tons ECU/t
Total grain
Base 1.85 4.20 11.78 15.02 na na na na
Scenario 3 1.85 3.55 5.79 7.67 na na na na
Scenario 4 1.85 3.55 3.02 4.89 na na na na
Wheat
Base 1.45 1.65 4.95 6.20 80 108 101 100
Scenario 3 1.45 1.56 1.99 3.19 80 108 113 108
Scenario 4 1.45 1.56 0.35 0.92 80 108 97 91
Coarse Grain
Base 0.40 2.56 6.84 8.82 na na na na
Scenario 3 0.40 1.99 3.79 4.48 na na na na
Scenario 4 0.40 1.99 2.67 3.97 na na na na
Barley
Base -0.01 0.00 0.29 0.61 78 101 93 92
Scenario 3 -0.01 -0.08 0.66 1.09 78 101 113 108
Scenario 4 -0.01 -0.08 -0.31 0.14 78 101 96 91
Sugar
Base 0.32 -0.08 -0.17 -0.13 392 428 403 397
Scenario 3 0.32 -0.08 1.73 1.80 392 428 609 579
Scenario 4 0.32 -0.08 10.5 1.07 392 428 516 491
Rapeseed
Base 0.59 0.30 0.72 0.87 185 228 218 210
Scenario 3 0.59 0.28 0.73 0.90 185 223 215 207
Scenario 4 0.59 0.28 0.87 0.99 185 223 210 204
Cont.
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sufficient to stimulate output in the CEEC-4, despite
lower poultry prices.
Under the base scenario, the CEEC-4 countries are
projected to have an exportable grain surplus of nearly
12 million tons in the year 2000, an increase of
around 10 million tons of grain surplus over the base
period (1989-91).  Only 1 million tons are projected
to originate from higher output while 9 million tons of
the increase is due to lower domestic demand, mainly
for feed use.  By 2005, net exports of cereals in the
CEEC-4 is forecast to rise by another 3 million tons
(table 18 and figure 6).
Accession to the EU (under scenario 3) adds around 3
million tons to domestic grain use in the CEEC-4 in
2000 due to higher livestock production in response to
better CAP prices.  At the same time, grain production
shrinks by around 3 million tons under scenario 3,
reflecting set-aside under the CAP.  Accession to the
EU under these assumptions reduces net export avail-
ability of grain in the CEEC’s in 2000 by 6 million
tons.  
Growth of CEEC cereal net exports between 2000 and
2005 is only less than 2 million tons under this sce-
nario. Rather than adding to CEEC surplus production
of cereals, accession to the EU under the policy
assumptions made here makes net export availability
of cereals decrease Set-aside is an important factor in
this equation.  Even if set aside is not extended to the
CEEC-4, higher grain utilization due to more live-
stock production would still mean lower net exports
of grains from the CEEC-4 when they are included in
the CAP compared to the base scenario.  In addition,
the composition of exports is different, i.e., less wheat
exports and somewhat higher exports of coarse grains
(scenario 3a in figure 6).
Net exports of other major products under the differ-
ent scenarios are more in line with usual expectations
(table 18 and figure 7).  For rapeseed, domestic use
Table 18—CEEC-4 aggregate net exports and market prices of major agricultural products under
alternative scenarios (cont.)
Net exports Market price
Product 1989/91 1995 2000 2005 1989/91 1995 2000 2005
Million tons ECU/t
Milk
Base 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 169 189 189 189
Scenario 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 169 189 311 295
Scenario 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 169 189 263 250
Butter
Base 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 1768 1709 1634 1627
Scenario 3 0.00 0.02 0.34 0.37 1768 1708 3362 3197
Scenario 4 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.25 1768 1708 2851 2711
Beef
Base 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 1436 1458 1507 1480
Scenario 3 0.07 -0.05 0.67 0.73 1436 1450 2999 2852
Scenario 4 0.07 -0.05 0.51 0.55 1436 1450 2543 2418
Pork
Base 0.24 -0.00 -0.17 -0.14 1087 986 1013 983
Scenario 3 0.24 0.13 1.11 1.30 1087 999 1333 1260
Scenario 4 0.24 0.13 1.05 1.23 1087 999 1247 1178
Poultry
Base 0.20 -0.04 -0.23 -.032 1253 1069 969 884
Scenario 3 0.20 0.07 0.00 -0.07 1253 1126 1277 1141
Scenario 4 0.20 0.07 0.03 -0.04 1253 1126 1210 1080
na=not applicable.
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(for crushing) is almost unaffected by EU accession,
and net exports reflect the output effect described
above.  For sugar, butter, beef, pork, and poultry, the
positive output effect of high prices in the CAP is
amplified by the negative consumption response to
higher prices, and net export availability is greatly
increased as a result.
A significant part of increased pork and poultry net
exports from the CEEC-4 will go to the rest of the
EU, rather than to third countries.  As a result, pork
and poultry producers in the EU-12 will face growing
competition from their colleagues in the “new” mem-
ber countries in the east.  Given the lack of domestic
EU price support for pork and poultry, increased com-
petition from the acceding CEEC countries will
depress prices in the western EU (as it does in ESIM). 
Whether the CEEC-4 become large net exporters of
pork does not depend on just the price but also on the
quality of the pork, which requires sufficient invest-
ment to upgrade the breeding, growing, and process-
ing of hogs to meet EU sanitary regulations and quali-
ty standards.  The analytical framework can only
account for price differentials and assumes quality to
be the same; whether over the next 10 years the
CEEC’s can match the quality of EU pork and export
to EU countries remains to be seen.  Environmental
problems in the EU-12 in pork production may in fact
favor the transfer of production to the CEEC-4.
Dutch and Danish hog producers are already investi-
gating the possibility of transferring production to the
CEEC-4.  With Dutch and Danish capital and know-
how, CEEC-4 production and quality could improve
significantly over the next few years.     
The pork and poultry sectors may be where the effects
of eastern enlargement are most directly felt by farm-
ers in the EU-12.  However, with lower CAP prices
(scenario 4), net exports of the CEEC-4 are somewhat
reduced for all except poultry, where the output
increase mentioned above results in slightly higher net
exports.  The point is that the CEEC-4 will put pres-
sure on livestock markets within the EU and is less
likely to pressure the world market. 
Budget Effects for the CAP and the CEEC-4
The most dramatic effects of CEEC-4 accession occur
in the budget sector (figure 8).  If the CEEC-4 coun-
tries do not join the EU (base scenario), their net bud-
get expenditure on agricultural market policies (subsi-
dies less tariff revenues) remains negligible for the
projection period.  However, if the CEEC-4 join the
EU and implement CAP reform as it stands (scenario
3), then budget expenditure at the time of accession
shoots up to around 7 billion ECU (in 1993 ECU’s).
With a more restrictive level of support prices under
the CAP (scenario 4), 2 billion ECU’s in expenditure
can be saved in the CEEC-4, but even then expendi-
ture is some 5 billion ECU’s higher than with a con-
tinuation of 1993 CEEC policies.  Budget expendi-
tures under the accession scenarios decline somewhat
from 2000-2005 because domestic EU prices are
assumed to decline in real terms, and thereby come a
little closer to world market prices.
These figures contain a number of important mes-
sages.  CEEC-4 accession will place a heavy burden
on the EU budget if the CAP is not changed.  Budget
problems will be exacerbated if quotas are not
imposed on CEEC-4 sugar and milk production (as
assumed under scenario 3).  Compared with projected
CAP expenditures for an EU not including the
CEEC’s, the magnitude of potential CAP expenditures
in the CEEC-4 is put in perspective.
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Under scenario 3, expenditures projected for 2000 by
ESIM is 13.9 billion ECU’s for agriculture in the EU-
15.  ESIM does not cover all types of CAP expendi-
tures, as noted before. The expenditures reported here,
for both the EU and the CEEC-4, are considerably
below actual CAP expenditure.  Expenditures for the
CEEC-4 of 7 billion ECU’s means that their accession
raises CAP expenditures by approximately 50 percent.
For the year 2005, the predicted expenditure increase
due to CEEC-4 accession is similar in percentage
terms. 
The percent increase of CAP expenditures resulting
from enlargement is important under the formal bud-
get guideline mechanism for the CAP.  According to
that mechanism, European Agriculture Guarantee and
Guidance Fund (FEOGA) guarantee expenditure (in
real terms) must not grow by more than 0.74 times the
rate of (real) growth of GDP in the Union.  In the
past, that mechanism applied only to growth over
time, and will continue to do so.
When the EFTA-3 countries acceded to the EU in
1995, the same mechanism was used across countries
to calculate the additional FEOGA expenditures
allowable due to enlargement in relation to the EFTA-
3 countries’ contribution to GDP in the EU.  If that
same principle were to be applied to CEEC accession,
then FEOGA guarantee expenditures should not be
allowed to increase by more than approximately 3
percent on CEEC enlargement (table 16).  The addi-
tional CAP expenditures projected by ESIM would
exceed that margin by far, the first important message
of CEEC enlargement.  
Three different conclusions can be drawn from the
costs associated with accession of the CEEC-4:
•  It is sometimes argued that the EU is unable to
absorb the CEEC-4, or at least not their agriculture.
For political and economic reasons, such a conclu-
sion is untenable. The Union has the political will
to take the CEEC-4 aboard, and CEEC-4 accession
with agriculture not included is an unconvincing
proposition. 
•  Overall, political and economic benefits of CEEC
accession to the EU could be argued to be so large
that side issues such as the CAP budget guideline
and general considerations as budgetary concerns
should simply be disregarded.  The political diffi-
culties that could be created in the member states
from Brussels’ need for more available finance,
should not be underestimated.  A cautious strategy
would make sure that such difficulties do not
reduce the political acceptability, in the general
public, of CEEC accession. 
•  Another conclusion derives from the high budget
burden that an extension of the post-MacSharry
CAP to the CEEC-4 is likely to create, which is a
good reason to consider more changes in the CAP.
From many points of view this conclusion seems
the most convincing.  
A second type of message that can be derived from
the budget results reported in figure 8 concerns the
direction in which future changes of the CAP might
go.  A reduction of the level of price support would
certainly be a step in the right direction.  The price
cuts considered under scenario 4 would not only save
(in comparison with scenario 3) 2 billion ECU’s in the
CEEC-4, it would also save 3 billion ECU’s in CAP
expenditures in the existing EU. 
Another related consideration is the CAP system of
compensation payments and set-asides.  As shown in
figure 8, expenditures in the CEEC-4 under scenario
3a in 2000 and 2005 is some 3.5 billion ECU’s less
than under scenario 3.  This saving is due both to less
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Figure 8
Budget costs for CEEC's under 
alternative scenarios
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expenditures (on export subsidies) due to nonintro-
duction of set-asides and to less expenditures due to
nonpayment of compensation in the CEEC-4.  Given
that an expenditure of this magnitude is involved, the
future of set-aside and compensation payments under
the CAP may have to be reconsidered in the context
of CEEC accession.
Third, before accession to the EU, the CEEC-4 have
to finance their agricultural policies out of their
national budgets.  Hence, the budget figures presented
in figure 8 can also be interpreted as showing expen-
ditures to be borne by the CEEC-4 if they were to
align their policies with the CAP without actually
joining the EU. 
For example, if the CEEC-4 were to adopt CAP price
levels by the year 2000 without quotas, set-asides, or
compensation payments (scenario 3a), then in aggre-
gate they would have to finance export subsidies (net
of import tariffs) at the rate of 3.5 billion ECU’s.
This figure would be considerably above expected
expenditures under a continuation of their 1993 real
prices in the base scenario.  If accession were to take
a few more years to materialize, then the CEEC’s
would have to continue to bear that expenditure bur-
den out of their national budgets until they can finally
join the EU.  Given the difficulty of making any pre-
diction regarding the date of CEEC accession, this
would be a rather dangerous uncertainty for future
agricultural policy in the CEEC’s.
Likely EU Approaches to the CEEC
“Agricultural” Problem
Based on the results obtained in this analysis, future
accession by the Visegrad-4 countries (and, by impli-
cation, of other CEEC’s), would affect agricultural
markets and policy conditions in the EU significantly,
much more so than accession by the EFTA countries.
However, the exact type of the implications to be
expected, and the situation for individual commodi-
ties, will depend on the nature of the CAP at the time
the EU is enlarged.  Three major alternative future
strategies are conceivable for the CAP in the face of
eastern enlargement of the EU.
Alternative Enlargement Strategies
The first strategy would be to exclude CEEC-4 agri-
culture from the CAP; the CEEC-4 would join the
EU, but, through specific agricultural border mea-
sures, their agricultural markets and policies would be
kept outside for a long, indefinite transition period.
This strategy, though technically feasible, would be
politically difficult to accept.  Access to EU agricul-
tural markets is one of the major economic benefits
the CEEC-4 expect from joining the EU.  Moreover,
keeping CEEC-4 agriculture outside would mean that
border controls, and hence non-implementation of the
Single Market, would be required just for the sake of
agricultural policies.  Strategies that would allow the
CEEC’s to come aboard with their agricultural sectors
would probably be more prudent.
A second strategy would be to maintain the CAP
unchanged after the full implementation of the
MacSharry reform and extend that policy fully to the
CEEC-4, or scenario 3.  In order to reduce the exces-
sive extra-budgetary costs for the CAP under scenario
3, it would then be necessary to maintain, and possi-
bly intensify, supply controls in the EU and to impose
these controls on the CEEC’s.  Set-aside would also
be required in the CEEC’s, and production quotas
would be implemented for sugar and milk.  
To what extent the imposition of quotas on CEEC
sugar and milk production would result in savings
against the results presented here under scenario 3
depends on the quota levels that can be negotiated
with the CEEC-4, a politically difficult problem in
itself.  Under this strategy it would be hard to exclude
the CEEC’s from compensation payments paid out of
the EU budget.  Exclusion of the CEEC-4 from the
EU’s financed compensation payments would not
only be unfair in a distributional sense, but also dis-
tortive as disparate production incentives would be
provided for agricultural producers in the west and the
east of an enlarged EU. 
It would also be essentially impossible to implement
set-aside in the CEEC-4 if compensation payments
were not extended, as the only incentive to participate
in set-aside for farmers would be the loss of compen-
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set-aside program.  However, inclusion of the CEEC-
4 in the MacSharry compensation payments would
cost the EU significantly more than is saved by lower
surplus production of cereals as a result of set-aside.
Moreover, it is not really clear why compensation
payments should be extended to the CEEC-4.
Compensation payments are thought to compensate
EU farmers for the loss in revenue resulting from the
price reductions implemented as part of the
MacSharry reform.  Such price reductions will not
occur in the CEEC-4 in the course of their accession
to the EU.
This strategy would complicate the EU’s and the
CEEC-4’s commitments to the GATT and the WTO.
Alignment of agricultural policies in the Visegrad-4
countries with an unreformed, post-MacSharry CAP
by the year 2000 would seriously threaten these coun-
tries’ ability to honor their GATT commitments in
agriculture.  If the Visegrad-4 countries were to move
their agricultural policies gradually toward an unre-
formed, post-MacSharry CAP (as assumed in scenario
3), they would likely violate a large part of their
GATT commitments before the year 2000.  Also, tar-
iff bindings in the Visegrad-4 countries (except
Poland) are below those of the EU and would not pro-
vide sufficient protection for moving domestic prices
toward those in the EU.  In addition, the higher
exports from the Visegrad-4 countries that result from
price alignment with the EU would not be consistent
with many export subsidy bindings of the Visegrad-4
countries.  Even if the Visegrad-4 countries were to
pursue their policies in line with their GATT commit-
ments before accession but then had to implement an
unreformed CAP after accession, the enlarged EU
would have major difficulties in the GATT negotia-
tions pursued under Article XXIV:6 under the cus-
toms union code.  Compensation for trade damage,
which the EU would likely have to offer its trading
partners in the GATT, might simply be too high.
A third strategy for the CAP might be to reduce sup-
port prices further after the MacSharry reform, possi-
bly to the point where export subsidies are no longer
necessary in most years, such as in scenario 4.  As
part of this strategy, set-aside could be relaxed or
eliminated, and quotas for sugar and milk could be
abandoned if price cuts for these products were suffi-
cient.  Compensation could be paid for both past and
future price cuts, but ideally any compensation would
be decoupled completely from production.  Moreover,
turning over responsibility for compensation pay-
ments to member states would be more reconcilable. 
This reform strategy, if announced and embarked
upon in time, would set a completely different and
more realistic target for future policies in the CEEC’s.
The CEEC’s would be less tempted to raise their lev-
els of protection and support if they knew the CAP
would have to be reformed again after they joined the
EU. 
Under this strategy, compensation payments financed
from Brussels would not necessarily have to be paid
to farmers in the CEEC’s.  Compliance with GATT
commitments in agriculture would be far less of a
problem for both the EU and the CEEC’s.  Successful
preparation in agriculture for a smooth incorporation
of the CEEC’s into the EU in the decade to come may
require the EU to consider this strategy very
carefully.26
26 The EU Commission (1995b) argued similarly in its
Agricultural Strategy Paper, an important document issued after
the present study was completed.  For its projections of future
market developments in the CEEC, as presented in the
Commission’s paper, the Commission relied partly on ESIM runs
done specifically for that purpose.  As both the policy scenarios
and a number of assumptions used for those runs were different
from those used for the present study, the results are not strictly
comparable.                               44 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
Forecast Balances for an EU-19
Given the results of national referenda and the
announcement of Agenda 2000 by the European
Commission, the new EU members will not include
Norway, Switzerland, or Slovakia shortly after the
year 2000 as assumed in this analysis.  But, the con-
sensus opinion at the time of this analysis was that
Slovakia would be included in the first wave, leading
to an EU-19.  Although Cyprus, Estonia, and Slovenia
are included in the first wave, their agricultures and
populations are quite small relative to the other
entrants and are not considered in this analysis.
Following are brief analyses of grains and livestock
balances of an EU-19, including Slovakia, under dif-
ferent scenarios.
Grains
The effects of the CEEC-4 on EU-19 production, con-
sumption, and trade dominate the changes compared
with the 3 EFTA countries that  joined the EU in
1995.  As mentioned above, higher prices for the
CEEC-4 result in less consumption and more produc-
tion of livestock products in scenario 3 compared with
the base scenario.  On the other hand, CAP reform
results in set-aside, which lowers grain production in
the CEEC-4 as well as the EU-15.  Hence, grain pro-
duction is lower when the CEEC-4 join the CAP than
in the base scenario where they are not in the CAP.
For the EU-19 as a whole, grain production is lower
while grain consumption is higher in scenario 3 than
in the baseline scenario, which leads to lower grain
exports when the CEEC-4 join the EU (table 19).       
The price of meat, significantly higher in the CEEC-4
under the CAP in scenario 3, leads to higher produc-
tion and a significant increase in feed demand by the
CEEC-4 compared with the baseline scenario.  This
increase in feed demand for grains, in addition to
lower production as a result of set aside as dictated by
1992 CAP reform, leads to overall net exports of
grains in the EU-19 in scenario 3 that are lower than
in the base scenario.
Livestock 
Higher meat prices for the CEEC-4 in an EU-19 lead
to greater meat production, less meat consumption,
and, for the most part, greater net meat exports in an
EU-19 for scenario 3 compared with the base scenario
(table 20).  This result holds true for all meat cate-
gories of beef, pork, and poultry.  Net exports of beef
and pork are marginally higher in 2005 in scenario 3
than in the 1989/91 base period, while net poultry
exports are somewhat lower.  
The results for livestock seem reasonable under the
assumptions used for modeling.  In practical terms,
however, it is questionable whether the CEEC-4
would take over a substantial portion of the current
pork market in the EU given quality differences and a
limited international market.  The results for beef and
poultry do seem plausible both for the internal EU
market and for the world market.  
Implications for the EU-19 
of Enlargement to the East
As stated before, scenario 4 represents a simple
attempt to reduce the budgetary costs to the EU of
absorbing the CEEC-4 into the CAP by reducing
prices without compensation.  Intervention prices are
reduced for grains and livestock products—with the
Table 19—EU-19 grain production, consump-
tion, and net trade under alternative scenarios,
1989/91-2005
Year Base Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Million tons
Production
1989/91 241.68 241.68 241.68
1995 222.49 224.14 224.12
2000 254.89 244.37 239.3
2005 280.46 268.72 263.04
Consumption
1989/91 211.83 211.83 211.83
1995 210.27 211.90 211.89
2000 215.65 219.65 222.68
2005 218.80 223.3 226.43
Net trade
1989/91 29.86 29.86 29.86
1995 12.21 12.84 13.03
2000 39.24 24.52 17.82
2005 61.65 45.63 38.81
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exception of pork and poultry, the prices of which are
set by the internal EU market.  Beef and grain prices
are reduced by approximately 15 percent by the year
2005 in scenario 4 while pork and poultry prices drop
by 6 percent and 8 percent, respectively.  Production
of grains and livestock products decline as a result of
the price decreases compared to scenario 3, while
consumption increases.  
The combination of lower production and higher con-
sumption leads to lower net exports of all commodi-
ties in scenario 4 than in scenario 3 for the EU-19.
Lower production and lower exports also result in
lower budget costs for the CAP, but farmers receive
less total income.  Livestock producers’ net income
will likely increase because prices for feed inputs
have declined, although some beef producers will see
a decline in net profit because price support has
declined for beef.  Pork and poultry producers would
likely profit more than producers of other products
because their feed input costs have decreased propor-
tionately more than their prices have declined.  In any
event, the drop in feed prices would be more advanta-
geous for pork producers than other livestock produc-
ers because pigs are more intensive consumers of
grains than other livestock are.
Table 20—Production, consumption, and net trade of beef, pork, and poultry under alternative sce-
narios, 1989/91-2005
Base Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Year Beef Pork Poultry Beef Pork Poultry Beef Pork Poultry
Production Million tons
1989/91 9.95 18.62 7.61 9.95 18.62 7.61 9.95 18.62 7.61
1995 9.36 18.00 7.93 9.45 18.30 8.00 9.44 18.20 8.00
2000 9.95 18.51 8.46 10.37 19.04 8.78 10.01 18.93 8.80
2005 10.45 18.81 8.72 10.90 19.40 9.13 10.42 19.28 9.15
Consumption
1989/91 9.19 17.82 7.12 9.19 17.82 7.12 9.19 17.82 7.12
1995 9.80 17.66 7.72 9.79 17.80 7.76 9.78 17.71 7.77
2000 10.18 18.29 8.44 9.82 18.13 8.40 10.22 18.14 8.46
2005 10.36 18.56 8.79 10.01 18.44 8.74 10.43 18.46 8.80
Net trade
1989/91 0.76 0.79 0.49 0.76 0.79 0.49 0.76 0.79 0.49
1995 -0.44 0.34 0.21 -0.34 0.50 0.23 -0.34 0.49 0.23
2000 -0.23 0.22 0.02 0.56 0.92 0.38 -0.21 0.79 0.34
2005 0.09 0.25 -0.07 0.88 0.96 0.40 -0.01 0.82 0.34
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Conclusions  
It is important to recognize that this analysis was
completed in 1994 without adjusting U.S. policies to
the 1996 Farm Act and without anticipating the high
world prices that resulted from the 1996
supply/demand situation.  While these phenomena
have not been taken into account in the short run, the
results presented are likely to accurately reflect the
most likely outcomes for the EU after the year 2000. 
It is clear from the model results that the CAP, in its
current form, will have to be reformed or modified
significantly if it is to meet its GATT commitments
and/or if it is to be enlarged to include the Central and
Eastern European countries.  The EU Commission, in
its Agenda 2000, recognized this and called for fur-
ther reform of the CAP through reductions in inter-
vention prices of beef, grains, and dairy (similar to
scenario 4 analyzed for this report).  Regardless of
what scenario is used—standing pat with present poli-
cies, lowering prices, or slowing technological
growth—the CAP appears destined for reform once
again, whether to meet its GATT commitments or to
absorb the CEEC’s.  
The traditional EU reaction to short-term phenomena
in agriculture is to devise short-term policies that cre-
ate more long-term problems, a likely outcome of the
problem of agriculture in EU enlargement to the east.
However, the EU must take into account its future
relations with its trading partners in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the political and economic
viability that the EU needs so desperately.   
Recent declarations27 by Guy Legras, Director
General of the EU’s Agricultural Directorate, indicate
that the Commission is resigned to reforming the CAP
not only to accommodate the east but to comply with
the new GATT rules that will exert pressure on the
CAP in the year 2000, if not before.  Director General
Legras also indicated that the change in U.S. farm
policy played a role in pushing the EU to the realiza-
tion that it will have to move to world prices.  
The German Farm Ministry revealed the same conclu-
sions in the press28 but with more emphasis on the
need to accommodate eastern countries.  The political
desire of the Germans to incorporate the Visegrad-4
countries stems from the historical fact that a stable
middle Europe is essential to German peace and pros-
perity.  A stable middle Europe also augurs well for a
politically stable and economically prosperous
European continent.  In addition, the Germans and
other EU member states want to meet stringent fiscal
requirements that would allow them to enter into the
EU’s single currency in 1999.  Qualifying for mem-
bership in the single currency will require an imposi-
tion of tight fiscal policies, which are likely to rein in
spending on the CAP.29
The absorption of the three EFTA countries into the
CAP has been a relatively painless affair for all coun-
tries in spite of political and structural obstacles, but it
was done with much anticipation and with countries
that were economically and legally prepared for mem-
bership.  The ease with which Austria, Finland, and
Sweden joined the EU contrasts sharply with the agri-
cultural “land mines” that face the entry of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
Nevertheless, the precedents set by the incorporation
of the EFTA countries in 1995 represent the most
likely conditions under which the CEEC’s will join
the EU.  
The results of this analysis indicate that there would
be high budgetary costs incurred by the EU if the
CEEC-4 were allowed to enter under the current CAP
and the threat posed to farmers in the west by farmers
in the east of Europe.  However, there are potentially
high financial and political costs if the CEEC’s are not
absorbed into the EU in a way that is consistent with
international agreements and the mutual interests of
west and east Europe.  
The financial costs of enlarging the EU to absorb the
Visegrad-4 are calculable under various scenarios, but
the incalculable political costs of not including the
CEEC’s in the EU are potentially more critical to a
relatively stable, prosperous, and peaceful Europe
than any other issue of the day.  This is not to say that
there are no political costs to be incurred by absorbing
the Visegrad-4 because of reforms that must be made
27 Agra Europe, June 21, 1995.
28 Financial Times, London, July 1, 1996. 29 Financial Times, London, July 24, 1996.Economic Research Service/USDA Agriculture and European Union Enlargement 47
to the CAP or because of increased competition from
the east.  
While the principal source of concern is the budgetary
cost to the EU of absorbing the CEEC-4, specific
agricultural sectors will be at risk in the current EU.
Grains and oilseeds do not present a problem while
livestock products from the Visegrad-4 clearly pose a
threat to the EU according to ESIM results.  While
many unknowns surround this conclusion, including
the ability of eastern European farmers to meet quality
standards demanded by law and EU consumers,
model results indicate that Central Europe will benefit
more from exporting livestock products (principally
pigmeat) than any other sector.  Lower labor costs in
the CEEC’s will reinforce this tendency.  
Various solutions to the dilemma that the EU faces for
enlargement include not requiring the CEEC’s to set
aside land, which would allow the EU to forgo the
costs of compensation payments.  This would solve
the budget issue but then would raise the issue of set-
aside in the western EU.  A likely outcome is the low-
ering of CAP intervention prices, which both helps on
the budget side and could allow EU countries to
export grains without subsidy.  The possibility of
using world prices as the guide to production deci-
sions exists among many others,  which helps explain
the conundra facing EU policymakers as they tackle
the enlargement issue in various institutional, politi-
cal, and budgetary contexts.  
Likely Conclusions for U.S. Agricultural Trade
What does all of this mean for U.S. agriculture?  In a
sense, the United States may be looking at an
enlarged EU that will adjust its agricultural policies to
a great extent as the United States would like to have
seen at the last GATT negotiations, the Uruguay
Round.  U.S. agriculture is likely to gain world mar-
ket share in exports as the EU lowers its prices to con-
front the GATT limitations and its own budgetary
constraints.  U.S. agricultural exports of bulk com-
modities to the rest of the world will most likely
increase because of EU enlargement.     
A more market-oriented and enlarged EU would seem
to bestow distinct political and market advantages to
U.S. agriculture because of the 1996 Farm Act.  U.S.
farmers will rely more heavily on world prices for
their incomes as direct payments are gradually phased
out.  EU policy will also be more reliant on world
markets, which should give the United States an open-
ing to compete with the EU.  U.S. agriculture is gen-
erally acknowledged to have a comparative advantage
in bulk commodity trade, and will be able to exploit
that advantage and export more where the EU is not
able to supply future demand.  Prices would be higher
than they would be if the EU had not enlarged; quan-
tities traded by U.S. agriculture would be higher for
the same reason.  
The EU does appear to have a comparative advantage
in the production of high-value products (HVP).  With
lower prices in the EU as cited in scenario 4, the EU
could become more competitive without subsidies in
HVP trade.  However, this advantage would be tem-
pered somewhat by the increased intra-EU trade in the
EU-19 with HVP’s moving from west to east (with
the likely exception of meats, where the direction is
reversed).  An increase in intra-EU trade of HVP’s
could remove some EU trade from the world market,
allowing U.S. food companies to enter new markets. 48 Agriculture and European Union Enlargement Economic Research Service/USDA
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